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Abstract
Access control systems are widely used means for the protection of computing systems. They are defined in terms
of access control policies regulating the accesses to system resources. In this paper, we introduce a formally-defined,
fully-implemented framework for specification, analysis and enforcement of attribute-based access control policies.
The framework rests on FACPL, a language with a compact, yet expressive, syntax for specification of real-world
access control policies and with a rigorously defined denotational semantics. The framework enables the automatic
verification of properties regarding both the authorisations enforced by single policies and the relationships among
multiple policies. Effectiveness and performance of the analysis rely on a semantic-preserving representation of
FACPL policies in terms of SMT formulae and on the use of efficient SMT solvers. Our analysis approach explicitly
addresses some crucial aspects of policy evaluation, as e.g. missing attributes, erroneous values and obligations, which
are instead overlooked in other proposals. The framework is supported by Java-based tools, among which an Eclipse-
based IDE offering a tailored development and analysis environment for FACPL policies and a Java library for policy
enforcement. We illustrate the framework and its formal ingredients by means of an e-Health case study, while its
effectiveness is assessed by means of performance stress tests and experiments on a well-established benchmark.
1 Introduction
Nowadays computing systems have pervaded every daily activity and prompted the proliferation of several
innovative services and applications. These modern distributed systems manage a huge amount of data that,
due to its importance and societal impact, has brought out security issues of paramount importance. Con-
trolling the access to system resources is thus crucial to prevent unauthorised accesses that could jeopardise
trustworthiness of data.
This has prompted an increasing research interest towards access control systems, which are the first line
of defence for the protection of computing systems. They are defined by rules that establish under which
conditions a subject’s request for accessing a resource has to be permitted or denied. In practice, it amounts
to restrict physical and logical access rights of subjects to system resources.
Access control is a broad field, covering several different approaches, using different technologies and
involving various degrees of complexity. Since the first applications in operating systems, to the more recent
ones in distributed systems, many access control approaches have been proposed. Traditional approaches
are based on the identity of subjects, either directly – e.g., Access Control Matrix [29] – or through prede-
fined features, such as roles or groups – e.g., Role-Based Access Control (RBAC [17]). These approaches are
however inadequate for dealing with modern distributed systems, as they suffer from scalability and inter-
operability issues. Moreover, they cannot easily encompass information representing the evaluation context,
as e.g. system status or current time. An alternative approach that permits to overcome these problems is
Attribute-Based Access Control (ABAC) [21]. Here, the rules are based on attributes, which represent arbi-
trary security-relevant information exposed by the system, the involved subjects, the action to be performed,
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or by any other entity of the evaluation context relevant to the rules at hand. Thus, ABAC permits defining
fine-grained, flexible and context-aware access control rules that are expressive enough to uniformly represent
all the other approaches [25]. Attribute-based rules are typically hierarchically structured and paired with
strategies for resolving possible conflicting authorisation results. These structured specifications are called
policies; from this name derives the terminology Policy-Based Access Control (PBAC) [37], sometimes used
in place of ABAC.
Many languages have been proposed for the specification of access control policies (see, e.g., [19] for a
survey). Among the proposed languages, in the authors’ knowledge, the OASIS standard eXtensible Access
Control Markup Language (XACML) [38] is the best-known one. Due to its XML-based syntax and the
advanced access control features it provides, XACML is commonly used in many real-world systems, e.g., in
service-oriented ones. However, the management of real access control policies is in practice cumbersome and
error-prone, and should be supported by rigorous analysis techniques. Unfortunately, XACML is generally
acknowledged as lacking of a formally defined semantics (see, e.g., [41, 8, 40, 2]), which makes it difficult the
specification and realisation of analysis techniques.
To tackle these difficulties, we introduce a formally-defined, fully-implemented framework, based on
Formal Access Control Policy Language (FACPL), supporting developers in the specification, analysis and
enforcement of access control policies.
The FACPL-based Access Control Framework
The FACPL language defines a core, yet expressive, syntax for specification of high-level access control
policies. It is inspired by XACML (with which it shares the main traits of the policy structure and some
terminology), but it refines some aspects of XACML and introduces novel features from the access control
literature. Evaluation of FACPL policies is formalised by a denotational semantics, which clarifies intricate
aspects of access controls like, e.g., management of missing attributes (i.e. attributes controlled by a policy
but not provided by the request to authorise) and formalisation of combining algorithms (i.e. strategies to
resolve conflictual decisions that policy evaluation can generate).
The analysis functionalities offered by our framework enable verification of two main groups of properties
of FACPL policies. The authorisation properties permit to statically reason on the result of the evaluation
of a policy with respect to a specific request, by also considering additional attributes that can be possibly
introduced in the request at run-time and that might lead to unexpected authorisations. Instead, the
structural properties permit to statically reason on the whole set of results of the evaluation of one or more
policies and can be exploited, e.g., to implement maintenance and change-impact analysis [18] techniques.
The verification of these properties requires extensive checks on very large (possibly infinite) amounts of
requests, hence support through software tools is essential. As no off-the-shelf analysis tool directly takes
FACPL specifications in input, our framework exploits a constraint formalism that permits uniformly rep-
resenting policy elements and enabling automated analysis. The constraint formalism we introduce is based
on Satisfiability Modulo Theories (SMT) formulae, that is formulae defining satisfiability problems involving
multiple theories, e.g. boolean and linear arithmetic ones. The relevant progress made in the development
of automatic SMT solvers has led SMT to be extensively employed in diverse analysis applications [13], even
for access control policies [2, 46]. In practice, SMT-based approaches are more effective than many other
ones, like e.g. decision diagrams [18] or description logic [26]. The soundness of our analysis techniques is
guaranteed by the correspondence, which we formally prove, between the semantics of FACPL policies and
that of their constraint-based representations.
Our framework is supported by a Java-based software toolchain. The key software tool is an Eclipse-
based IDE that offers a tailored development and analysis environment for FACPL policies. Specifically, it
helps access control policy developers in the tasks of specification, analysis and enforcement of policies by
providing, e.g., static checks on the code and automatic generation of runnable SMT and Java code. The
evaluation of the SMT code relies on the Z3 solver [12], while the policy enforcement relies on an expressly
developed Java library.
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Fig. 1: The FACPL evaluation process
Contributions
The main contribution of this paper is the development of a comprehensive methodology supporting the
whole life-cycle of access control policies, from their specification and analysis to their enforcement. Each
ingredient of the methodology is formally introduced in this paper, together with its tool implementation.
The tools allow access control system developers to use formally-defined functionalities without requiring
them to be familiar with formal methods.
Our methodology enhances the proposals from the literature to different extents, in order to provide a
single framework where all the relevant functionalities are expressed and formalised in a uniform manner.
Indeed, XACML does not come with any formal specification and, hence, analysis; the formally-grounded
proposals in [24, 8, 40, 10] do not offer any supporting tools; the SMT-based analysis proposals in [2, 46] do not
support some crucial features (e.g., missing attributes and obligation instantiation). Detailed comparisons
with the relevant literature are in Section 9.
Our aim is to design an expressive language whose formal foundations enable tool-supported analysis,
rather than to face XACML semantic issues or supersede it. Further contributions of this paper are sum-
marised below.
• The FACPL semantics manages missing attributes in a way similar to [8, 10] and extends it with
explicit error management.
• The formalisation of combining algorithms extends that of [31] with explicit combination of obligations
and with different instantiation strategies.
• The authorisation properties explicitly take into account the non-monotonicity issue of policy evalua-
tion [45] by appropriately employing the request extensions set of [9] for property formalisation.
• The main structural properties of [18] and [26] are uniformly formalised in terms of policy semantics.
• The constraint formalism defines a low-level, tool-independent representation of attribute-based policies
that is capable to deal with all issues regarding policy evaluation.
• The validation of the proposal is carried out through experiments on a standard benchmark in the field
of access control tools, i.e. the CONTINUE [28] case study.
This paper is a revised and extended version of [36, 34]. Besides significant revisions and extensions
of syntax and semantics of FACPL (we refer to Section 9 for a detailed comparison) this paper proposes
a complete development methodology for access control policies. Most of all, differently from previous
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works, we introduce a constraint-based representation of FACPL policies enabling the verification of various
properties through SMT solvers.
Summary of the rest of the paper. In Section 2 we overview the FACPL evaluation process. In Section 3
we introduce an e-Health case study we use throughout the paper as a running example. In Section 4 we
present the syntax of FACPL and its informal semantics, together with the FACPL-based specification of the
case study. In Section 5 we formally define the FACPL semantics. In Section 6 we introduce the constraint
formalism and the representation it enables of FACPL policies. In Section 7 we introduce various properties
for access control policies and their verification via SMT solvers. In Section 8 we outline the Java-based
software toolchain. In Section 9 we discuss the closest related work and, finally, in Section 10 we conclude
and touch upon directions for future work. Appendixes A and B report, respectively, all the definitions for
combining algorithms, and the proofs of the formal results.
2 The FACPL Evaluation Process
The FACPL evaluation process of (access control) policies and requests is shown in Figure 1. It defines the
interactions, leading to the final authorisation decision, among three key components: the Policy Repository
(PR), the Policy Decision Point (PDP) and the Policy Enforcement Point (PEP). These entities and their
interactions were introduced in [49] to define the evaluation process of policy-based systems. Each policy
language, e.g. XACML, has then tailored them according to its specific features.
The evaluation process assumes that system resources are paired with one or more FACPL policies, which
define the credentials necessary to gain access to such resources. The PR stores the policies and supplies
them to the PDP (step 1), which then decides if the access can be granted.
When PEP receives a request (step 2), the credentials contained in the request are encoded as a sequence
of attribute elements (i.e., name-value pairs representing arbitrary information relevant for evaluating the
access request) forming a FACPL request (step 3). PEPs can have many different forms, e.g. a gateway or a
Web server. Therefore, this encoding allows policies and requests to be written and evaluated independently
of their specific nature.
The context handler sends the request to the PDP (step 4), by possibly adding environmental attributes,
e.g. request receiving time, that may be used in the evaluation.
The PDP authorisation process computes the PDP response for the request by checking the attributes,
that may belong either to the request or to the environment (steps 5-8), against the controls contained in the
policies. The PDP response (steps 9-10) contains an authorisation decision and possibly some obligations.
The decision is one among permit, deny, not-app and indet1. The meaning of the first two ones is obvious,
the third one means that there is no policy that applies to the request and the latter one means that some
errors have occurred during the evaluation. Policies can automatically manage these errors by using operators
that combine, according to different strategies, indet decisions with the others.
Obligations are instead additional actions connected to the access control system that must be discharged
by the PEP through appropriate obligation services (steps 11-12). Obligations usually correspond to, e.g.,
updating a log file, sending a message or executing a command. The enforcement process performed by the
PEP determines the enforced decision (step 13) on the basis of the result of obligations discharge. This
decision could differ from that of the PDP and is the outcome of the evaluation process.
It is worth noticing that the FACPL evaluation process guarantees separation of concerns among policies,
their evaluation and the system itself. Among others, the main advantages it ensures are: (i) different types
of requests can be handled, as the PEP can appropriately encode them in the format required by the PDP;
(ii) the PDP can be placed in any point of the system, with the PEP acting as a gateway or a proxy; (iii)
the PR can be also instantiated to support dynamic, possibly regulated, modifications of policies2.
1 The FACPL supporting tools can handle the same extended indeterminate values dealt with by XACML (see Section 8).
However, for the sake of presentation, in the formal specification of FACPL we only consider a single indeterminate value, rather
than the whole set.
2 When PR provides also support for the specification of administration controls on policy modifications, it is usually called
Policy Administration Point (PAP).
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Fig. 2: e-Prescription service protocol
3 An e-Health case study
The case study we consider throughout this paper concerns the provision of e-Health services for exchanging
private health data. In this context, we will show that access control policies expressed in FACPL can control
accesses to health data in order to preserve data confidentiality and integrity.
The exchange of patients health data among European points of care (such as clinics, hospitals, pharma-
cies, etc.) has been pursued by the EU through the large scale pilot project epSOS (http://www.epsos.eu).
The goal is to establish a suite of standardised data exchanging services for facilitating the cross-border
interoperability [27] of the EU country healthcare systems and professionals (such as doctors, nurses, phar-
macists, etc.), thus ultimately improving the effectiveness of healthcare treatments to EU citizens that are
abroad. These services must respect a set of requirements in order to comply with country-specific legisla-
tions [16, 44] and to enforce the patient informed consent, i.e. the patients informed indications pertaining
to personal data processing.
As a case study for this paper, we consider the electronic prescription (e-Prescription) service. This service
allows EU patients, while staying in a foreign country B participating to the project, to have dispensed a
medicine prescribed by a doctor in the country A where the patient is insured. The protocol implemented
by this service is illustrated in the message sequence diagram in Figure 2. The e-Prescription service helps
pharmacists in country B to retrieve (and properly convert) e-Prescriptions from country A; this is due to
trusted actors named National Contact Points (NCPs). Therefore, once a pharmacist has identified the
patient (Alice), the remote access is requested to the local NCP (NCP-B), which in its own turn contacts
the remote NCP (NCP-A)3. The latter one retrieves the e-Prescriptions of the patient from the national
infrastructure and, for each e-Prescription, performs through PEP-A an authorisation check against the
patient informed consent. In details, PEP-A asks PDP-A to evaluate the pharmacist request with respect to
the e-Prescription and the policies expressing the patient consent. Once all decisions are enforced by PEP-A,
NCP-A creates the list of e-Prescriptions, by transcoding and translating them into the code system and
language of the country B. Finally, the pharmacist dispenses the medicine to the patient and updates the
e-Prescription, i.e. it returns e-Dispensation documents.
Starting from the epSOS specifications, we deduced a set of business requirements concerning the e-
Prescription service. To streamline the presentation, we explicitly report in Table 1 all and only those
requirements authorising some actions. Hence, every action not explicitly authorised is forbidden. For
instance, it is not allowed to pharmacists to write e-Prescriptions, which is instead allowed to doctors
3 For the sake of presentation, we abstract from the authentication process carried out by the pharmacist to ascertain the
patient identity.
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exhibiting specific permissions. All the requirements are self-explanatory. We just want to point out that the
first three requirements deal with access restrictions, while the other ones deal with additional functionalities
that sophisticated access control systems, like the one we present, can provide.
Tab. 1: Requirements for the e-Prescription service
# Description
1 Doctors with e-Pre-Read and e-Pre-Write permissions can write e-Prescriptions
2 Doctors with e-Pre-Read permission can read e-Prescriptions
3 Pharmacists with e-Pre-Read permission can read e-Prescriptions
4 Authorised user accesses must be recorded by the system
5 Patients must be informed of unauthorised access attempts
6 Data exchanged should be compressed
4 The FACPL Language
In this section we present FACPL, the language we propose for defining high-level access control policies
and requests. First, we introduce its syntax (Section 4.1). Then, we informally explain the semantics of its
linguistic constructs (Section 4.2) and employ them to implement the access control system of the e-Health
case study (Section 4.3).
4.1 Syntax
Intuitively, FACPL policies are hierarchically structured lists of elements containing controls on the value of
attributes that should be provided by FACPL access requests. Together with permit or deny decisions, policies
specify the combining algorithms to be used in their evaluation and the obligations for the enforcement
process.
Formally, the syntax of FACPL is reported in Table 2. It is given through EBNF-like grammars, where
as usual the symbol ? stands for optional items, ∗ for (possibly empty) sequences, and + for non-empty
sequences.
A top-level term is a Policy Authorisation System (PAS) encompassing the specifications of a PEP and
a PDP. The PEP is defined by the enforcement algorithm applied for establishing how decisions have to be
enforced, e.g. if only decisions permit and deny are admissible, or also not-app and indet can be returned.
The PDP is instead defined by a policy, or by a sequence of policies and an algorithm for combining the
results of the evaluation of these policies.
A policy is made of a sequence of fields separated by keywords. It can be either a basic authorisation
rule or a policy set collecting rules and other policy sets, so that policies can be hierarchically structured. A
rule specifies an effect, that is the permit or deny decision returned when the rule is successfully evaluated,
a target, that is an expression indicating the set of access requests to which the rule applies, and a sequence
of obligations, that is actions to be discharged by the enforcement process. A policy set specifies a target,
a sequence of enclosed policies along with an algorithm for combining the results of their evaluation, and
two sequences of obligations, one to be discharged if the resulting effect is permit, the other if it is deny.
Obligation sequences may be empty, while policy sequences cannot.
An attribute name refers to the literal value associated to the attribute. The name is structured in
the form Identifier/Identifier , where the first identifier stands for a category name and the second for an
attribute name. For example, the structured name subject/role represents the value of the attribute role
within the category subject. Categories permit a fine-grained classification of attributes, varying from the
usual categories of access control, i.e. subject, resource and action, to possibly application-dependent ones.
Expressions are built from attribute names and literal values, i.e. booleans, doubles, strings, and dates,
by using standard operators. As usual, string values are written as sequences of characters delimited by
double quotes.
Combining algorithms offer different strategies to merge the decisions resulting from the evaluation of
various policies (e.g. the p-overδ algorithm states that decision permit takes precedence over the others).
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Tab. 2: Syntax of FACPL
Policy Auth. Systems PAS ::= { pep : EnfAlg pdp : PDP }
Enforcement algorithms EnfAlg ::= base | deny-biased | permit-biased
Policy Decision Points PDP ::= Policy | {Alg policies : Policy+}
Combining algorithms Alg ::= p-overδ | d-overδ | d-unless-pδ | p-unless-dδ | first-appδ | one-appδ |
weak-conδ | strong-conδ
Instantiation strategies δ ::= greedy | all
Policies Policy ::= Rule
| {Alg target :Expr policies : Policy+ obl-p : Obligation∗ obl-d : Obligation∗ }
Rules Rule ::= (Effect target :Expr obl : Obligation∗ )
Effects Effect ::= permit | deny
Obligations Obligation ::= [ ObType PepAction(Expr∗) ]
Obligation types ObType ::= m | o
Expressions Expr ::= Name | Value | and(Expr ,Expr) | or(Expr ,Expr) | not(Expr)
| equal(Expr ,Expr)in(Expr ,Expr) | greater-than(Expr ,Expr) | add(Expr ,Expr)
| subtract(Expr ,Expr) | divide(Expr ,Expr) | multiply(Expr ,Expr)
Attribute names Name ::= Identifier/Identifier
Literal values Value ::= true | false | Double | String | Date
Requests Request ::= (Name,Value)+
Tab. 3: Auxiliary syntax for FACPL responses
PDP responses PDPResponse ::= 〈Decision IObligation∗〉
Decisions Decision ::= permit | deny | not-app | indet
Instantiated oblig. IObligation ::= [ ObType PepAction(Value∗) ]
They can be specialised by choosing different strategies for the instantiation of obligations (e.g. the greedy
strategy states that only the obligations resulting from the actually evaluated policies are returned). In the
algorithm names, p and d are shortcuts for permit and deny, respectively.
An obligation specifies a type, i.e. mandatory (m) or optional (o), and identifier and arguments of an
action to be performed by the PEP. The set of action identifiers accepted by the PEP can be chosen, from
time to time, according to the specific application (therefore, PepAction is intentionally left unspecified).
Action arguments are expressions.
A request consists of a (non-empty) sequence of attributes, i.e. name-value pairs, that enumerate request
credentials in the form of literal values. Multivalued attributes, i.e. names associated to a set of values, are
rendered as multiple attributes sharing the same name.
The responses resulting from the evaluation of FACPL requests are written using the auxiliary syntax
reported in Table 3. The two-stage evaluation process described in Section 2 produces two different kinds
of responses: PDP responses and decisions (i.e. responses by the PEP). The former ones, in case of de-
cision permit and deny, pair the decision with a (possibly empty) sequence of instantiated obligations. An
instantiated obligation is a pair made of a type (i.e., m or o) and an action whose arguments are values.
To simplify notations, in the sequel we will omit the keyword preceding a sub-term generated by the
grammar in Table 2 whenever the sub-term is missing or is the expression true. Thus, e.g., the rule
(deny target : true obl : ) will be simply written as (deny). Moreover, when in the PDPResponse the
sequence of instantiated obligations is empty, we sometimes write Decision instead of 〈Decision〉.
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4.2 Informal Semantics
We now informally explain how the FACPL linguistic constructs are dealt with in the evaluation process of
access requests described in Section 2. We first present the PDP authorisation process and then the PEP
enforcement process.
When the PDP receives an access request, first it evaluates the request on the basis of the available
policies. Then, it determines the resulting decision by combining the decisions returned by these policies
through the top-level combining algorithm.
The evaluation of a policy with respect to a request starts by checking its applicability to the request,
which is done by evaluating the expression defining its target. Let us suppose that the applicability holds,
i.e. the expression evaluates to true. In case of rules, the rule effect is returned. In case of policy sets, the
result is obtained by evaluating the contained policies and combining their evaluation results through the
specified algorithm. In both cases, the evaluation ends with the instantiation of the enclosed obligations. Let
us suppose now that the applicability does not hold. If the expression evaluates to false, the policy evaluation
returns not-app, while if the expression returns an error or a non-boolean value, the policy evaluation returns
indet. Clearly, the target of enclosed policies may refine that of the enclosing ones, while a policy with target
expression true (resp., false) applies to all (resp., no) requests.
Evaluating expressions amounts to apply operators and to resolve the attribute names occurring within,
that is to determine the value corresponding to each such name. This value can either be contained in
the request or retrieved from the environment by the context handler (steps 5-8 in Figure 1). Thus, if an
attribute with that name is missing in the request and its retrieval by the context handler fails, the special
value ⊥ is returned. Taking the value ⊥ apart from errors permits both carefully managing those requests
only containing a limited set of attributes and reasoning on the role of missing attributes in policy evaluation
(see Section 7 for details).
It is worth noticing that the syntax of policies, and in particular that of attribute names and expressions,
does not consider types. Indeed, we want a policy to provide a response to any request, not only to those
complying with the expected type of (the values referred by) the attribute names controlled by the policy.
Since we do not filter requests on the base of the type of their attributes, we cannot in general statically ensure
that expressions within policies are well-typed. Consequently, errors will be generated at evaluation-time ,
and possibly managed, when expression operators are applied to arguments of unexpected type.
Indeed, the evaluation of expressions takes into account the types of the operators’ arguments, and
possibly returns the special values ⊥ and error. In details, if the arguments are of the expected type, the
operator is applied, else, i.e. at least one argument is error, error is returned; otherwise, i.e. at least one
argument is ⊥ and none is error, ⊥ is returned. The operators and and or implement a different treatment
of these special values. Specifically, and returns true if both operands are true, false if at least one operand is
false, ⊥ if at least one operand is ⊥ and none is false or error, and error otherwise (e.g. when an operand is
not a boolean value). The operator or is the dual of and. Hence, and and or may mask ⊥ and error. Instead,
the unary operator not only swaps values true and false and leaves ⊥ and error unchanged. In the rest, we
use operators and and or in infix notation, and assume that they are commutative and associative, and that
operator and takes precedence over or.
The evaluation of a rule ends with the instantiation of all the enclosed obligations, while that of a policy
set ends with the instantiation of all the obligations in the sequence corresponding to the decision calculated
for the policy. The instantiation of an obligation consists in evaluating every expression argument of the
enclosed action. If an error occurs, the policy decision is changed to indet. Otherwise, the instantiated
obligations are paired with the policy decision to form the PDP response.
Evaluating a policy set requires the application of the specified algorithm for combining the decisions
resulting from the evaluation of various policies and, thus, resolving possible conflicts, e.g. whenever both
decisions permit and deny occur. Given a sequence of policies in input, the combining algorithms prescribe
the sequential evaluation of the given policies and behave as follows:
• p-overδ (d-overδ is specular): if the evaluation of a policy returns permit, then the result is permit. In
other words, permit takes precedence, regardless of the result of any other policy. Instead, if at least
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one policy returns deny and all others return not-app or deny, then the result is deny. If all policies
return not-app, then the result is not-app. In the remaining cases, the result is indet.
• d-unless-pδ (p-unless-dδ is specular): similarly to p-overδ, this algorithm gives precedence to permit over
deny, but it always returns deny in all the other cases.
• first-appδ: the algorithm returns the evaluation result of the first policy in the sequence that does not
return not-app, otherwise the result is not-app.
• one-appδ: when exactly one policy is applicable, the result of the algorithm is that of the applicable
policy. If no policy applies, the algorithm returns not-app, while if more than one policy is applicable,
it returns indet.
• weak-conδ: the algorithm returns permit (resp., deny) if some policies return permit (resp., deny) and
no other policy returns deny (resp., permit); if both decisions are returned, the algorithm returns indet.
If policies only return not-app or indet, then indet, if present, prevails.
• strong-conδ: this algorithm is the stronger version of the previous one, in the sense that to obtain
permit (resp., deny) all policies have to return permit (resp., deny), otherwise indet is returned. If all
policies return not-app then the result is not-app.
The algorithms described in the first four items above are those popularised by XACML. They combine
decisions either according to a given precedence criterium or to policy applicability. The remaining two
algorithms, instead, are borrowed from [31] and compute the combined decision by achieving different forms
of consensus.
If the resulting decision is permit or deny, each algorithm also returns the sequence of instantiated
obligations according to the chosen instantiation strategy δ. There are two possible strategies. The all
strategy requires evaluation of all policies in the input sequence and returns the instantiated obligations
pertaining to all decisions. Instead, the greedy strategy prescribes that, as soon as a decision is obtained that
cannot change due to evaluation of subsequent policies in the input sequence, the execution halts. Hence, the
result will not consider the possibly remaining policies and only contains the obligations already instantiated.
Therefore, the instantiation strategies mainly affect the amount of instantiated obligations possibly returned.
The greedy strategy, that reflects the management of obligations in XACML, may significantly improve the
policy evaluation performance. Instead, the all strategy may require additional workload but, on the other
hand, ensures that all the policies and their obligations are always taken into account.
As last step, the calculated PDP response is sent to the PEP for the enforcement. To this aim, the
PEP must discharge all obligations and decide, by means of the chosen enforcement algorithm, how to
enforce decisions not-app and indet. The algorithms are those popularised by XACML and, in particular, the
deny-biased (resp., permit-biased) one enforces permit (resp., deny) only when all the corresponding obligations
are correctly discharged, while enforces deny (resp., permit) in all other cases. Instead, the base algorithm
leaves all decisions unchanged but, in case of decisions permit and deny, enforces indet if an error occurs
while discharging obligations. This means that obligations not only affect the authorisation process due to
their instantiation, but also the enforcement one. However, errors caused by optional obligations, i.e. with
type o, are safely ignored.
4.3 Policies for the e-Health case study
We now use the FACPL linguistic abstractions to formalise the requirements for the e-Health case study
reported in Table 1. These rules are meant to prevent unauthorised access to patient data and hence to ensure
their confidentiality and integrity. The specification of this access control system is introduced bottom-up,
from single rules to whole policies, thus illustrating in a step-by-step fashion the combination strategies that
could be pursued and their effects.
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The system resources to protect via the access control system are e-Prescriptions. The access control
rules need to deal with requester credentials, i.e. doctor and pharmacist roles, along with their assigned
permissions, and with read or write actions.
Requirement (1), allowing doctors to write e-Prescriptions, can be formalised as a positive FACPL rule
(i.e., a rule with effect permit) as follows
( permit target : equal(subject/role, “doctor”)
and equal(action/id, “write”)
and in(“e-Pre-Write”, subject/permission)
and in(“e-Pre-Read”, subject/permission))
The rule target4 checks if the requester role is doctor, if the action is write, and if the subject’s permissions
include those for writing and reading an e-Prescription. The control that the resource type is equal to e-
Prescription will be performed by the target of the policy enclosing the rule. This, because of the hierarchical
processing of FACPL elements, is enough to ensure that the rule will only be applied to e-Prescriptions.
Requirement (2) can be expressed like the previous: it differs for the action identifier and for the required
permissions, i.e. only e-Pre-Read. Requirement (3) only differs from the second for the role value.
These three rules, modelling Requirements (1), (2) and (3), can be combined together in a policy set
whose target specifies the check on the resource type e-Prescription (again, to improve code readability, we
use textual encoding for resources). Since all granted requests are explicitly authorised, choosing the p-overall
algorithm as combining strategy seems a natural choice. Let thus Policy (P1) be defined as follows
{ p-overall
target : equal(resource/type, “e-Prescription”)
policies :
( permit target : equal(subject/role, “doctor”)
and equal(action/id, “write”)
and in(“e-Pre-Write”, subject/permission)
and in(“e-Pre-Read”, subject/permission))
( permit target : equal(subject/role, “doctor”)
and equal(action/id, “read”)
and in(“e-Pre-Read”, subject/permission))
( permit target : equal(subject/role, “pharmacist”)
and equal(action/id, “read”)
and in(“e-Pre-Read”, subject/permission))
obl-p : [ m log(system/time, resource/type, subject/id, action/id) ] }
(P1)
Policy (P1) reports not only access controls but also an obligation formalising Assumption (4) about the
logging of each authorised access. The arguments of the obligation action are separated by commas to
increase their readability.
Let us now consider a FACPL request and evaluate it with respect to Policy (P1). For the sake of
presentation, hereafter we write A , t to assign the symbolic name A to the term t. Let us suppose that
doctor Dr. House wants to write an e-Prescription; the corresponding request is defined as follows
req1, (subject/id, “Dr. House”)
(subject/role, “doctor”) (action/id, “write”)
(resource/type, “e-Prescription”)
(subject/permission, “e-Pre-Read”)
(subject/permission, “e-Pre-Write”) . . .
4 To improve code readability, we use the infix operators, a textual notation for permissions and an additional check on
the subject role. Of course, in a setting with semantically different roles, a standardised permission-based coding, e.g. HL7
(http://www.hl7.org), should be used for defining role checks.
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where attributes are organised into the categories subject, resource and action. Additional attributes pos-
sibly included in the request are omitted because they are not relevant for this evaluation. Notice that
subject/permission is a multivalued attribute and it is properly handled in the previous rules by using the in
operator, which verifies the membership of its first argument to the set that forms its second argument.
The authorisation process of req1 returns a permit decision. In fact, the request matches the policy target,
as the resource type is e-Prescription, and exposes all the permissions required in the first rule for the write
action and the doctor role. The response, that is a permit including a log obligation, is defined, e.g., as
follows
〈 permit [ m log(2016-10-22 10:15:12, “e-Prescription”, “Dr. House”, “write”) ]〉
The instantiated obligation indicates that the PDP succeeded in retrieving and evaluating all the attributes
occurring within the arguments of the action; run-time information, such as the current time, is retrieved
through the context handler.
The evaluation of req1 returns the expected result. We might be led to believe that due to the simplicity
of Policy (P1), this is true for all requests. However, this correctness property cannot be taken for granted as,
in general, even though the meaning of a rule is straightforward, this may not be the case for a combination
of rules. Depending on the chosen combination strategy, some unexpected results can arise. For example, a
request by a pharmacist for a write action on an e-Prescription is not explicitly allowed by the requirements
in Table 1; hence, it should be forbidden. However, the corresponding request
req2, (subject/id, “Dr. Wilson”)
(subject/role, “pharmacist”) (action/id, “write”)
(resource/type, “e-Prescription”)
(subject/permission, “e-Pre-Read”) . . .
would evaluate to not-app. In fact, all enclosed rules do not apply (i.e., their targets do not match) and
the resulting not-app decisions are combined by the p-overall algorithm to not-app as well. Therefore, the
enforcement algorithm of the PEP is entrusted with the task of taking the final decision for request req2.
Even though this is correct in a setting where the PEP is well-defined, e.g. the epSOS system, it is not
recommended when design assumptions on the PEP implementation are missing. In fact, a biased algorithm
might transform not-app into permit, possibly causing unauthorised accesses.
To prevent not-app decisions to be returned by the policy, we can replace the combining algorithm of
Policy (P1) with the d-unless-pall one. This implies that deny is taken as the default decision and is returned
whenever no rule returns permit. Alternatively, we can get the same achievement by using a policy set
defined as the combination, through the p-overall algorithm, of Policy (P1) and a rule forbidding all accesses.
This rule is simply defined as (deny): the absence of the target and the negative effect means that it always
returns deny. Now, let Policy (P2) be defined as
{ p-overall
policies : { . . .Policy (P1 ) . . . } (deny)
obl-p : [ o compress( ) ]
obl-d : [ m mailTo(resource/patient-mail,
“Data request by unauthorised subject”) ] }
(P2)
Policy (P2) reports two obligations formalising, respectively, the last two requirements of Table 1: (i) a
patient is informed about unauthorised attempts to access her data by means of an obligation for the effect
deny and (ii) if possible, data are exchanged in compressed form by means of an obligation for the effect
permit. Notably, the type ‘optional’ is exploited so that compressed exchanges are not strictly required but,
e.g., only whenever the corresponding service is available.
Policy (P2) can be used as a basis for the definition of the patient informed consent (see Section 3).
For instance, Alice’s policy for the management of her health data could be simply obtained by adding a
check on the patient identifier to which the policy applies, such as target : equal(“Alice”, resource/patient-id),
to Policy (P2). In this way, Alice grants access to her e-Prescription data to the healthcare professionals
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Tab. 4: Correspondence between syntactic and semantic domains
Syntactic Generic Semantic Syntactic Semantic
category synt. elem. function domain domain
Attribute names n Name
Literal values v Value
Requests req R Request R , Name → (Value ∪ 2Value ∪ {⊥})
Expressions expr E Expr R→ Value ∪ 2Value ∪ {error,⊥}
Effects e Effect
Obligation Types t ObType
Pep Actions pepAct PepAction
Instantiated obligations io IObligation
Obligations o O Obligation R→ IObligation ∪ {error}
PDP Responses res PDPReponse
Policies p P Policy R→ PDPReponse
Policy Decision Points pdp Pdp PDP R→ PDPReponse
Combining algorithms a A Alg × Policy+ R→ PDPReponse
Decisions dec Decision
Enforcement algorithms ea EA EnfAlg PDPReponse → Decision
Policy Auth. System pas Pas PAS Request → Decision
that satisfy the requirements expressed in her consent policy. Another patient expressing a more restrictive
consent, where e.g. writing of e-Prescriptions is disabled, will have a similar policy set where the rule
modelling Requirement (1) is not included. In a more general perspective, the PDP could have a policy set
for each patient, that encloses the policies expressing the consent explicitly signed by the patient. This is
the approach followed, e.g., in the Austrian e-Health platform (http://www.elga.gv.at/).
As shown before, it could be challenging to identify unexpected authorisations and to determine whether
policy fixes affect authorisations that should not be altered. The combination of a large number of complex
policies is indeed an error-prone task that has to be supported with effective analysis techniques. Therefore
we equip FACPL with a formal semantics and then define a constraint-based analysis providing effective
supporting techniques for the verification of properties on policies.
5 FACPL Formal Semantics
In this section, we present the formal semantics of FACPL by formalising the evaluation process introduced
in Section 2 and detailed in Section 4.2. The semantics is defined by following a denotational approach which
means that
• we introduce some semantic functions mapping each FACPL syntactic construct to an appropriate
denotation, that is an element of a semantic domain representing the meaning of the construct;
• the semantic functions are defined in a compositional way, so that the semantic of each construct is
formulated in terms of the semantics of its sub-constructs.
To this purpose, we specify a family of semantic functions mapping each syntactic domain to a specific se-
mantic domain. These functions are inductively defined on the FACPL syntax through appropriate semantic
clauses following a ‘point-wise’ style. For instance, on the syntactic domain Policy representing all FACPL
policies, we formalise the function P that defines a semantic domain mapping FACPL requests to PDP
responses.
In the sequel, we convene that the application of the semantic functions is left-associative, omits paren-
thesis whenever possible, and surrounds syntactic objects with the emphatic brackets [[ and ]] to increase
readability. For instance, E [[n]]r stands for (E(n))(r) and indicates the application of the semantic function
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E to (the syntactic object) n and (the semantic object) r . We also assume that each nonterminal symbol
in Tables 2 and 3 (defining the FACPL syntax) denominates the set of constructs of the syntactic cate-
gory defined by the corresponding EBNF rule, e.g. the nonterminal Policy identifies the set of all FACPL
policies. The used notations are summarised in Table 4 (the missing semantic domains coincide with the
corresponding syntactic ones).
In the rest of this section, we detail the semantics of requests (Section 5.1), PDP (Sections 5.2 and 5.3),
PEP (Section 5.4), Policy Authorisation System (Section 5.5) and present some properties of the semantics
(Section 5.6).
5.1 Semantics of Requests
The meaning of a request5 is an element of the set R , Name → (Value∪2Value∪{⊥}), that is a total function
that maps attribute names to either a literal value, or a set of values (in case of multivalued attributes),
or the special value ⊥ (if the value for an attribute name is missing). The mapping from a request to its
meaning is given by the semantic function R : Request → R, defined as follows:
R[[(n ′, v ′)]]n =
{
v ′ if n = n ′
⊥ otherwise
R[[(ni, vi)+(n ′, v ′)]]n =
{
R[[(ni, vi)+]]n uniondbl v ′ if n = n ′
R[[(ni, vi)+]]n otherwise
(S-1)
The semantics of a request, which is a function r ∈ R, is thus inductively defined on the length of the request.
To deal with multivalued attributes we introduce the operator uniondbl, which is straightforwardly defined by case
analysis on the first argument as follows
v uniondbl v′ = {v, v′} V uniondbl v′ = V ∪ {v′} ⊥ uniondbl v′ = v′
where we let V ∈ 2Value .
5.2 Semantics of the Policy Decision Process
We start defining the semantics of expressions and obligations that will be then exploited for defining the
semantics of policies.
In Table 5 we report (an excerpt of) the clauses defining the function E : Expr → (R→ Value ∪ 2Value ∪
{error,⊥}) modelling the semantics of expressions. This means that the semantics of an expression is a
function of the form R → Value ∪ 2Value ∪ {error,⊥} that, given a request, returns a literal value, or a set
of values, or the special value ⊥, or an error (e.g. when an argument of an operator has unexpected type).
The evaluation order of sub-expressions is not relevant, as they do not generate side-effects.
The first raw of the table contains the clauses for basic expressions, i.e. attribute names and literal values.
The semantics of the expression formed by a name n is a function that, given a (semantic) request r in input,
returns the value that r associates to n. This is written as the clause E [[n]]r = r(n). Similarly, the case of a
value v is a function that always returns the value itself, that is the clause E [[v ]]r = v.
The remaining clauses, one for each operator, present (an excerpt of) the semantics of expression oper-
ators. In particular, each clause uses straightforward semantic operators for composing denotations (e.g. =
corresponds to equal), and implements the management strategy for the special values ⊥ and error. The
clauses establish that error takes precedence over ⊥ and is returned every time the operator arguments have
unexpected types; whereas ⊥ is returned when at least an argument is ⊥ and there is no error. The clauses of
operators and and or possibly mask these special values by implementing the behaviour informally described
5 For simplicity sake, here we assume that, when the evaluation of a request takes place, the original request has been already
enriched with the information that would be retrieved at run-time from the environment by the context handler (steps 5-8 in
Figure 1).
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Tab. 5: Semantics of (an excerpt of) FACPL Expressions (T stands for one of the sets of literal values or for
the powerset of the set of all literal values, and i, j ∈ {1, 2} with i 6= j)
E[[n]]r = r(n) E[[v ]]r = v
E[[or(expr1, expr2)]]r =
true if E[[expr1]]r = true ∨ E[[expr2]]r = true
false if E[[expr1]]r = E[[expr2]]r = false
⊥ if E[[expr i]]r =⊥ ∧ E[[exprj ]]r ∈ {false,⊥}
error otherwise
E[[and(expr1, expr2)]]r =
true if E[[expr1]]r = E[[expr2]]r = true
false if E[[expr1]]r = false ∨ E[[expr2]]r = false
⊥ if E[[expr i]]r =⊥ ∧ E[[exprj ]]r ∈ {true,⊥}
error otherwise
E[[not(expr)]]r =
true if E[[expr ]]r = false
false if E[[expr ]]r = true
⊥ if E[[expr ]]r =⊥
error otherwise
E[[add(expr1, expr2)]]r =
(E[[expr1]]r + E[[expr2]]r) if E[[expr1]]r , E[[expr2]]r ∈ Double
⊥ if E[[expr i]]r =⊥ ∧ E[[exprj ]]r 6= error
error otherwise
E[[in(expr1, expr2)]]r = (E[[expr1]]r ∈ E[[expr2]]r) if E[[expr1]]r ∈ T ∧ E[[expr2]]r ∈ 2
T
⊥ if E[[expr i]]r = ⊥ ∧ E[[exprj ]]r 6= error
error otherwise
E[[equal(expr1, expr2)]]r =
(E[[expr1]]r = E[[expr2]]r) if E[[expr1]]r , E[[expr2]]r ∈ T
⊥ if E[[expr i]]r = ⊥
∧ E[[exprj ]]r 6= error
error otherwise
in Section 4.2. It is worth noticing that the explicit management of missing attributes and evaluation errors
ensures a full account of crucial aspects of access control policy evaluation, usually neglected by other pro-
posals from the literature (see, e.g., [24, 40, 2]). The only proposals considering the role of missing attributes
are those in [8, 10], but they only consider a simplified policy language and assume that expressions cannot
generate errors.
Function E is straightforwardly extended to sequences of expressions by the following clauses
E [[]]r = 
E [[expr ′ expr∗]]r = E [[expr ′]]r • E [[expr∗]]r
(S-2)
The operator • denotes concatenation of sequences of semantic elements and  denotes the empty sequence.
We assume that • is strict on error and ⊥, i.e. error is returned whenever an error or ⊥ is in the sequence.
Therefore, the evaluation of E [[expr∗]]r fails if any of the expressions forming expr∗ evaluates to error or ⊥.
The semantics of the instantiation of obligations is formalised by the function O : Obligation → (R →
IOblgation ∪ {error}) defined by the clause
O[[[ t pepAct(expr∗) ]]]r ={
[ t pepAct(w∗) ] if E [[expr∗]]r = w∗
error otherwise
(S-3a)
where w stands for a literal value or a set of literal values. Thus, given a request, the instantiation of an
obligation returns an instantiated obligation, if the evaluation of every expression argument of the action
returns a value. Otherwise, it returns an error.
Function O is straightforwardly extended to sequences of obligations as follows
O[[]]r =  O[[o′o∗]]r = O[[o′]]r • O[[o∗]]r (S-3b)
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Notably, a sequence of instantiated obligations is returned only if every obligation in the sequence is suc-
cessfully instantiated; otherwise, error is returned (indeed, • is strict on error).
We can now define the semantics of a policy as a function that, given a request, returns an authorisation
decision paired with a (possibly empty) sequence of instantiated obligations. Formally, it is given by the
function P : Policy → (R → PDPReponse) that has two defining clauses: one for rules and one for policy
sets. The clause for rules is
P[[(e target : expr obl : o∗ )]]r =
〈e io∗〉 if E [[expr ]]r = true
∧ O[[o∗]]r = io∗
not-app if E [[expr ]]r = false
∨ E [[expr ]]r = ⊥
indet otherwise
(S-4a)
Thus, the rule effect is returned as a decision when the target evaluates to true, which means that the
rule applies to the request, and all obligations are successfully instantiated. In this case, the instantiated
obligations are also part of the response. Otherwise, it could be the case that (i) the rule does not apply to
the request, i.e. the target evaluates to false or to ⊥, or that (ii) an error has occurred while evaluating the
target or instantiating the obligations.
The semantics of policy sets relies on the semantics of combining algorithms. Indeed, as detailed in
Section 5.3, we use a semantic function A to map each combining algorithm a to a function that, to a
sequence of policies, associates a function from requests to PDP responses. The clause for policy sets is
P[[{a target : expr policies : p+ obl-p : o∗p obl-d : o∗d }]]r
=
〈permit io∗1 • io∗2〉 if E [[expr ]]r = true
∧A[[a, p+]]r = 〈permit io∗1〉
∧ O[[o∗p ]]r = io∗2
〈deny io∗1 • io∗2〉 if E [[expr ]]r = true
∧A[[a, p+]]r = 〈deny io∗1〉
∧O[[o∗d ]]r = io∗2
not-app if E [[expr ]]r = false
∨ E [[expr ]]r = ⊥
∨ (E [[expr ]]r = true
∧ A[[a, p+]]r = not-app)
indet otherwise
(S-4b)
Thus, the policy set applies to the request when the target evaluates to true, the semantic of the combining
algorithm a (which is applied to the enclosed sequence of policies and the request) returns the effect e and
a sequence of instantiated obligations io∗1, and all the enclosed obligations for the effect e are successfully
instantiated and return a sequence io∗2. In this case, the PDP response contains e and the concatenation
of the sequences io∗1 and io
∗
2. Instead, if the target evaluates to false or to ⊥, or the combining algorithm
returns not-app, the policy set does not apply to the request. The response is indet in the remaining cases,
i.e. when an error occurred in the evaluation of the target or of the obligations, or when the evaluation of
the combining algorithm returned indet.
Finally, the semantic of a PDP is that function from requests to PDP responses obtained by applying
the combining algorithm to the enclosed sequence of policies, i.e.
Pdp[[{a policies : p+}]]r = A[[a, p+]]r (S-5)
5.3 Semantics of Combining Algorithms
The semantics of combining algorithms is defined in terms of a family of binary operators. Let alg denote the
name of a combining algorithm (i.e., p-over, d-over, etc.); the corresponding semantic operator is identified
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Tab. 6: Auxiliary definitions for the semantics of combining algorithms: (a) combination matrix for the
⊗p-over operator (res1 and res2 indicate the first and the second argument, respectively); (b) defi-
nition of the isFinalalg(res) predicate
(a)
res1\res2 〈permit io∗2〉 〈deny io∗2〉 not-app indet
〈permit io∗1〉 〈permit io∗1 • io∗2〉 〈permit io∗1〉 〈permit io∗1〉 〈permit io∗1〉
〈deny io∗1〉 〈permit io∗2〉 〈deny io∗1 • io∗2〉 〈deny io∗1〉 indet
not-app 〈permit io∗2〉 〈deny io∗2〉 not-app indet
indet 〈permit io∗2〉 indet indet indet
(b)
isFinalp-over (res) ={
true if res.dec = permit
false otherwise
isFinald-over (res) ={
true if res.dec = deny
false otherwise
isFinald-unless-p (res) ={
true if res.dec = permit
false otherwise
isFinalp-unless-d (res) ={
true if res.dec = deny
false otherwise
isFinalfirst-app (res) ={
false if res.dec = not-app
true otherwsise
isFinalone-app (res) ={
true if res.dec = indet
false otherwsise
isFinalweak-con (res) ={
true if res.dec = indet
false otherwsise
isFinal strong-con (res) ={
true if res.dec = indet
false otherwsise
as ⊗alg and is defined by means of a two-dimensional matrix that, given two PDP responses, calculates
the resulting combined response. For instance, Table 6(a) reports the combination matrix for the ⊗p-over
operator. Basically, the matrix specifies the precedences among the permit, deny, not-app and indet decisions,
and shows how the resulting (sequence of) instantiated obligations is obtained, i.e. by concatenating the
instantiated obligations of the responses whose decision matches the combined one. All other combining
algorithms described in Section 4.2, and possibly many others, can be defined in the same manner (see
Appendix A).
The semantics of the combining algorithms can be now formalised by the function A : Alg × Policy+ →
(R→ PDPReponse). This function is defined in terms of the iterative application of the binary combining
operators by means of two definition clauses according to the adopted instantiation strategy: the all strategy
always requires evaluation of all policies, while the greedy strategy halts the evaluation as soon as a final
decision is determined (i.e. without necessarily taking into account all policies in the sequence). If the all
strategy is adopted, the definition clause is as follows
A[[algall, p1 . . . ps]]r =
⊗alg(⊗alg(. . .⊗ alg(P[[p1]]r ,P[[p2]]r), . . .),P[[ps]]r)
(S-6a)
meaning that the combining operator is sequentially applied to the denotations of all input policies6. Instead,
if the greedy strategy is used, the definition clause is as follows
A[[alggreedy, p1 . . . ps]]r =
res1 if P[[p1]]r = res1 ∧ isFinalalg(res1)
res2 elseif ⊗alg(res1,P[[p2]]r) = res2
∧ isFinalalg(res2)... ...
ress-1 elseif ⊗alg(ress-2,P[[ps-1]]r) = ress-1
∧ isFinalalg(ress-1)
ress otherwise (where ress = ⊗alg(ress-1,P[[ps]]r)
(S-6b)
6 In case of a single policy, operators ⊗p-unless-d and ⊗d-unless-p turn the not-app and indet responses into, respectively,
〈permit 〉 and 〈deny 〉, while the remaining operators leave them unchanged.
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where the elseif notation is a shortcut to represent mutually exclusive conditions. The auxiliary predicates
isFinalalg (one for each combining algorithm alg), given a response in input, check if the response decision
is final with respect to the algorithm alg, i.e. if such decision cannot change due to further combinations.
Their definition is in Table 6(b); as a matter of notation, we use res.dec to indicate the decision of response
res. These predicates are straightforwardly derived from the combination matrices of the binary operators,
thus we only comment on salient points. In case of the p-over algorithm (and similarly for the others in the
first two rows of the table), the permit decision is the only decision that can never be overwritten, hence, it
is final. In case of the first-app algorithm, instead, all decisions except not-app are final since they represent
the fact that the first applicable policy has been already found. Both consensus algorithms have indet as
final decision, because no form of consensus can be reached once an indet is obtained. Similarly, the one-app
algorithm has indet as final decision.
5.4 Semantics of the Policy Enforcement Process
The semantics of the enforcement process defines how the PEP discharges obligations and enforces autho-
risation decisions. To define this process, we use the auxiliary function (( )) : IOblgation∗ → {true, false}
that, given a sequence of instantiated obligations, executes such obligations and returns a boolean value that
indicates whether the evaluation is successfully completed. Since failures caused by optional obligations can
be safely ignored by the PEP, only failures of mandatory obligations (i.e. of type m) have to be taken into
account. The function is defined as follows
(()) = true
(([ o pepAct(w∗) ] • io∗)) = ((io∗))
(([ m pepAct(w∗) ] • io∗)) =
{
((io∗)) if pepAct(w∗) ⇓ok
false otherwise
where ⇓ok denotes if the discharge of the action pepAct(w∗) succeeded. Since the set of action identifiers
is intentionally left unspecified (see Section 4.1), the definition of the predicate ⇓ok is hence unspecified
too; we just assume that it is total and deterministic. In other words, the syntactic domain PepAction is
a parameter of the syntax, while the predicate ⇓ok is a parameter of the semantics. The latter parameter
could be refined to deal with, e.g., obligations to be enforced after the decision releasing (see Section 10).
For example, discharging obligations could simply refer to the fact that the system has taken charge of their
execution, rather than to the fact that they have been completely executed.
The semantics of PEP is thus defined with respect to the enforcement algorithms. Formally, given an
enforcement algorithm and a PDP response, the function EA : EnfAlg → (PDPReponse → Decision) returns
the enforced decision. It is defined by three clauses, one for each algorithm. The clause for the deny-biased
algorithm follows
EA[[deny-biased]]res ={
permit if res.dec = permit ∧ ((res.io))
deny otherwise
(S-7a)
Likewise res.dec that indicates the decision of the response res, notation res.io indicates the sequence of
instantiated obligations of res. The permit decision is enforced only if this is the decision returned by the
PDP and all accompanying obligations are successfully discharged. If an error occurs, as well as if the PDP
decision is not permit, a deny is enforced. The clause for the permit-biased algorithm is the dual one, whereas
the clause for the base algorithm is as follows
EA[[base]]res =
permit if res.dec = permit ∧ ((res.io))
deny if res.dec = deny ∧ ((res.io))
not-app if res.dec = not-app
indet otherwise
(S-7b)
17
Both decisions permit and deny are enforced only if all obligations in the PDP response are successfully
discharged, otherwise they are enforced as indet. Instead, decisions not-app and indet are enforced without
modifications.
5.5 Semantics of the Policy Authorisation System
The semantics of a Policy Authorisation System is defined in terms of the composition of the semantics of
PEP and PDP. It is given by the function Pas : PAS → (Request → Decision) defined by the following
clause
Pas[[{ pep : ea pdp : pdp }, req ]] =
EA[[ea]](Pdp[[pdp]](R[[req ]])) (S-8)
Basically, given a request req in the FACPL syntax, this is converted into its functional representation by the
function R (see Section 5.1). This result is then passed to the semantics of the PDP, i.e. Pdp[[pdp]], which
returns a response that on its turn is passed to the semantics of the PEP, i.e. EA[[ea]]. The latter function
returns the final decision of the Policy Authorisation System when given the request req in input.
5.6 Properties of the Semantics
We conclude this section with some properties and results regarding the FACPL semantics.
The main result is that the semantics is total and deterministic. This means that it is defined for all
possible input pairs consisting of a FACPL specification, i.e. a Policy Authorisation System, and a request,
and that it always returns the same decision any time it is applied to a specific pair.
Theorem 5.1 (Total and Deterministic Semantics).
1. For all pas ∈ PAS and req ∈ Request, there exists a dec ∈ Decision, such that Pas[[pas, req ]] = dec.
2. For all pas ∈ PAS, req ∈ Request and dec, dec′ ∈ Decision, it holds that
Pas[[pas, req ]] = dec ∧ Pas[[pas, req ]] = dec′
⇒ dec = dec′ .
Proof. It boils down to show that Pas is a total and deterministic function (see Appendix B.1).
We now consider the so-called reasonability properties of [45] that precisely characterise the expressiveness
of a policy language. FACPL enjoys the property called independent composition of policies, which means
that the results of the combining algorithms depend only on the decisions of the policies given in input. This
clearly follows from the use of combination matrices. On the contrary, FACPL ensures neither safety, i.e. a
request that is granted may not be granted anymore if it is extended with new attributes, nor monotonicity,
i.e. the introduction of a new policy in a combination of policies may change a permit decision to a different
one. This should be somehow expected as these latter two properties are enjoyed neither by XACML nor by
other policy languages featuring deny rules and combining algorithms similar to those we have presented.
We conclude by highlighting the relationship between attribute names occurring in a policy and names
defined by requests. By letting Names(p) to indicate the set of attribute names occurring in (the expressions
within) p, we can state the following result which has important practical implications on the feasibility of
the automatic analysis.
Lemma 5.2 (Policy relevant attributes). For all p ∈ Policy and r , r ′ ∈ R such that r(n) = r ′(n) for all
n ∈ Names(p), it holds that P[[p]]r = P[[p]]r ′.
Proof. The property straightforwardly derives from the semantics of FACPL expressions and from Theo-
rem 5.1 (see Appendix B.1).
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6 FACPL Constraint-based Representation
The analysis of access control policies is essential for ensuring confidentiality and integrity of system resources.
In the case of FACPL, the analysis is made difficult by the hierarchical structure of policies, the presence
of conflict resolution strategies and the intricacies deriving from the many involved controls. Moreover, no
off-the-shelf analysis tool directly takes FACPL specifications in input. Hence, for enabling the analysis of
FACPL policies through well-established and efficient software tools, we introduce a constraint formalism
that permits, on the one hand, to uniformly represent policies and, on the other hand, to perform extensive
checks of (a possibly infinite number of) requests.
The constraint-based representation we propose specifies satisfaction problems in terms of formulae based
on multiple theories as, e.g., boolean and linear arithmetics. Such kind of formulae are usually called satis-
fiability modulo theories (SMT) formulae. The SMT-based approach is supported by the relevant progress
made in the development of automatic SMT solvers (e.g., Z3 [12], CVC4 [4], Yices [15]), which make SMT
formulae to be extensively employed in diverse analysis applications [13].
This section introduces our constraint-based representation of FACPL policies, while the analysis it
enables is presented in Section 7. We first introduce the constraint formalism (Section 6.1), then we present
the constraint representation of FACPL policies (Section 6.2) and some crucial results stating that it is a
semantic-preserving representation (Section 6.3), and finally we show some examples of constraints obtained
from our e-Health case study (Section 6.4).
6.1 A Constraint Formalism
The constraint formalism we present here extends boolean and inequality constraints with a few additional
operators aiming at precisely representing FACPL constructs. Intuitively, a constraint is a relation defined
through some conditions on a set of attribute names7. An assignment of values to attribute names satisfies
a constraint if all constraint conditions are matched. Our formalism, besides usual operators and values,
explicitly considers the role of missing attributes, by assigning ⊥ to attribute names, and of run-time errors,
i.e. type mismatches in constraint evaluations. In fact, according to the usually accepted semantics of access
control policies (besides XACML, see, e.g., [8, 10]), a condition involving a missing attribute should not be
evaluated to false by default.
Syntax. Constraints are written according to the following grammar.
Constr ::= Value | Name | isMiss(Constr)
| isErr(Constr) | isBool(Constr)
| ¬Constr | ¬˙Constr | Constr cop Constr
cop ::= ∧ | ∨ | ∧˙ | ∨˙ | = | > | ∈
| + | − | ∗ | /
where the nonterminals Value and Name are defined in Table 2. Thus, a constraint can be a literal value, an
attribute name, or a more complex constraint obtained through predicates isMiss(), isErr() and isBool(),
or through boolean, comparison and arithmetic operators. The operators ¬, ∧ and ∨ are the usual boolean
ones, while ¬˙, ∧˙ and ∨˙ correspond to the 4-valued ones of FACPL expressions which implement the special
management of ⊥ and error values.
In the sequel, in addition to the notations of Table 4, we use the letter c to denote a generic element of
the set of all constraints identified by the nonterminal Constr .
Semantics. The semantics of constraints is modelled by the function C : Constr → (R→ Value ∪ 2Value ∪
{error,⊥}) inductively defined by the clauses in Table 7 (the clauses for >, ∈, −, ∗ and / are omitted as they
are similar to those for = or +). Hence, the semantics of a constraint is a function that, given the functional
7 In the literature, constraints are typically defined on a set of variables. In our framework, the role of variables is played
by attribute names. Therefore, to maintain a coherent terminology throughout the paper, we refer to constraint variables as
attribute names.
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Tab. 7: Semantics of constraints (T stands for one of the sets of literal values or for the powerset of the set
of all literal values, and i, j ∈ {1, 2} with i 6= j)
C[[n]]r = r(n) C[[v ]]r = v
C[[isMiss(c)]]r ={
true if C[[c]]r =⊥
false otherwise
C[[isErr(c)]]r ={
true if C[[c]]r = error
false otherwise
C[[isBool(c)]]r ={
true if C[[c]]r ∈ {true, false}
false otherwise
C[[¬˙ c]]r =
true if C[[c]]r = false
false if C[[c]]r = true
⊥ if C[[c]]r =⊥
error otherwise
C[[c1 ∧˙ c2]]r =
true if C[[c1]]r = C[[c2]]r = true
false if C[[c1]]r = false or C[[c2]]r = false
⊥ if C[[ci]]r =⊥ and C[[cj ]]r ∈ {true,⊥}
error otherwise
C[[c1 ∨˙ c2]]r =
true if C[[c1]]r = true or C[[c2]]r = true
false if C[[c1]]r = C[[c2]]r = false
⊥ if C[[ci]]r =⊥ and C[[cj ]]r ∈ {false,⊥}
error otherwise
C[[¬ c]]r =
true if C[[c]]r = false
or C[[c]]r =⊥
false otherwise
C[[c1 ∧ c2]]r ={
true if C[[c1]]r = true and C[[c2]]r = true
false otherwise
C[[c1 ∨ c2]]r ={
true if C[[c1]]r = true or C[[c2]]r = true
false otherwise
C[[c1 = c2]]r =
true if C[[c1]]r , C[[c2]]r ∈T and C[[c1]]r = C[[c2]]r
false if C[[c1]]r , C[[c2]]r ∈T and C[[c1]]r 6= C[[c2]]r
⊥ if C[[ci]]r =⊥ and C[[cj ]]r 6= error
error otherwise
C[[c1 + c2]]r =
C[[c1]]r + C[[c2]]r if C[[c1]]r , C[[c2]]r ∈Double
⊥ if C[[ci]]r =⊥ and C[[cj ]]r 6= error
error otherwise
representation of a request (i.e., an assignment of values to attribute names), returns a literal value or a set
of literal values or one of the special values ⊥ and error.
The semantics of constraints, except for the cases of predicates and usual boolean operators, mimics the
semantic definitions of the corresponding FACPL expression operators defined in Table 5 (e.g., the constraint
operator ∨˙ corresponds to the expression operator or, as well as + corresponds to add). The clause defining
the semantics of predicate isMiss(c) (resp. isErr(c)) returns true only if the constraint c evaluates to ⊥
(resp. error), while that of predicate isBool(c) returns true only if the constraint c evaluates to a boolean
value. The clauses for usual boolean operators are instead defined by ensuring that only boolean values can
be returned. Specifically, they explicitly define conditions leading to result true, while in all the other cases
the result is false. The constraint ¬ c evaluates to true not only when the evaluation of c returns false, but
also when it returns ⊥. This is particularly convenient for translating FACPL policies because, in case of
not-app decisions, ⊥ is treated as false.
6.2 From FACPL Policies to Constraints
The constraint-based representation of a FACPL policy is a logical combination of the constraints repre-
senting targets, obligations and combining algorithms occurring within the policy. Of course, combining
algorithms using the greedy instantiation strategy are not dealt with, as we cannot statically predict when
the (sequential) evaluation of a sequence of policies can stop since the decision, that would have resulted
from evaluating the whole sequence, has been obtained. The translation is formally, and compositionally,
defined by a family of translation functions T·, that return the constraints representing the different FACPL
terms. We use the emphatic brackets {| and |} to represent the application of a translation function to a
syntactic term.
We start by presenting the translation of FACPL expressions, whose operators are very close to (some of)
those on constraints. The translation is formally given by the function TE : Expr → Constr , whose defining
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clauses are given below
TE{|v |} = v TE{|n|} = n
TE{|not(expr)|} = ¬˙TE{|expr |}
TE{|op(expr1, expr2)|} = TE{|expr1|} getCop(op) TE{|expr2|}
(T-1)
Thus, TE acts as the identity function on attribute names and values, and as an homomorphism on opera-
tors. In fact, FACPL negation corresponds to the constraint operator ¬˙, while the binary FACPL operators
correspond to the constraint operators returned by the auxiliary function getCop(). Its definition is straight-
forward, the main cases are defined as follows
getCop(and)= ∧˙ getCop(or)= ∨˙
getCop(equal)= = getCop(in)= ∈
getCop(greater-than)= > getCop(add)= +
The translation of (sequences of) obligations returns a constraint whose satisfiability corresponds to the
successful instantiation of all the input obligations. The translation function TOb : Obligation∗ → Constr is
defined below
TOb{||} = true
TOb{|o o∗|} = TOb{|o|} ∧ TOb{|o∗|}
TOb{|[t PepAction(expr∗)]|} =
∧
expr∈expr∗ ¬isMiss(TE{|expr |}) ∧ ¬isErr(TE{|expr |})
(T-2)
Hence, a sequence of obligations corresponds to the conjunction of the constraints representing each obliga-
tion. When translating a single obligation, predicates isMiss() and isErr() are used to check the instan-
tiation conditions, i.e. that the occurring expressions cannot evaluate to ⊥ or error. The n-ary conjunction
operator returns true if the considered obligation contains no expression (i.e., expr∗ = ).
The translation function for policies, TP , exploits the translation functions previously introduced, as
well as a function TA representing the result of applying a combining algorithm to a sequence of policies.
Functions TP and TA are indeed mutually recursive. Moreover, for representing all the decisions that a policy
can return, both these two functions return 4-tuples of constraints of the form
〈permit : cp deny : cd not-app : cn indet : ci 〉
where each constraint represents the conditions under which the corresponding decision is returned. We call
these tuples policy constraint tuples and denote their set by PCT . As a matter of notation, we will use the
projection operator ↓l which, when applied to a constraint tuple, returns the value of the field labelled by
l′, where l is the first letter of l′ (e.g., ↓p returns the permit constraint cp).
The function TP : Policy → PCT is defined by two clauses for rules, i.e. one for each effect, and one
clause for policy sets. The clause for rules with effect permit is
TP {|(permit target : expr obl : o∗ )|} =
〈 permit : TE{|expr |} ∧ TOb{|o∗|}
deny : false
not-app : ¬ TE{|expr |}
indet : ¬ (isBool(TE{|expr |}) ∨ isMiss(TE{|expr |})) ∨ (TE{|expr |} ∧ ¬TOb{|o∗|}) 〉
(T-3a)
(the clause for effect deny is omitted, as it only differs from the previous one because it swaps the permit and
deny constraints). The clause takes into account the rule constituent parts and combines them according to
the rule semantics (see clause (S-4a)). Because of the semantics of the constraint operator ¬, the not-app
constraint is satisfied when the constraint corresponding to the target expression evaluates to false or to
⊥. Instead, the negation of a constraint corresponding to a sequence of obligations represents the failure
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of their instantiation. In the indet constraint, together with condition ¬ isBool(TE{|expr |}), we introduce
¬ isMiss(TE{|expr |}) because we want to exclude that TE{|expr |} =⊥ (otherwise, we would fall in the case
of decision not-app ).
The clause for policy sets is as follows
TP {|〈 a target : expr policies : p+ obl-p : o∗p obl-d : o∗d 〉|}
=
〈 permit : TE{|expr |} ∧ TA{|a, p+|} ↓p ∧TOb{|o∗p |}
deny : TE{|expr |} ∧ TA{|a, p+|} ↓d ∧TOb{|o∗d |}
not-app : ¬ TE{|expr |} ∨ (TE{|expr |} ∧ TA{|a, p+|} ↓n)
indet :
¬ (isBool(TE{|expr |}) ∨ isMiss(TE{|expr |}))
∨ (TE{|expr |} ∧ TA{|a, p+|} ↓i)
∨ (TE{|expr |} ∧ TA{|a, p+|} ↓p ∧¬ TOb{|o∗p |})
∨ (TE{|expr |} ∧ TA{|a, p+|} ↓d ∧¬ TOb{|o∗d |} ) 〉
(T-3b)
With respect to the clauses for rules, it additionally takes into account the result of the application of the
combining algorithm according to the policy set semantics (see clause (S-4b)). It is worth noticing that the
exclusive use of operators ¬, ∧ and ∨ ensures that constraint tuples are only formed by boolean constraints.
Combining algorithms are dealt with by the function TA : Alg×Policy+ → PCT that, given an algorithm
(using the all instantiation strategy) and a sequence of policies, returns a constraint tuple representing the
result of the algorithm application. Its definition is
TA{|algall, p1 . . . ps|} =
alg(. . . alg(TP {|p1|}, TP {|p2|}), . . . , TP {|ps|})
(T-4)
By means of TP , the policies given in input are translated into constraint tuples which are then iteratively
combined, two at a time, according to the algorithm combination strategy. By way of example, the combi-
nation of two constraint tuples, say A and B, according to the p-over algorithm, is defined as follows
p-over(A,B) =
〈permit : A ↓p ∨B ↓p
deny : (A ↓d ∧B ↓d) ∨ (A ↓d ∧B ↓n) ∨ (A ↓n ∧B ↓d)
not-app : A ↓n ∧B ↓n
indet : (A ↓i ∧¬B ↓p) ∨ (¬A ↓p ∧B ↓i)〉
The combinations for the remaining algorithms are in Appendix A. If s = 1, i.e. there is only one argument
tuple, all the algorithms leave the input tuple unchanged, but for p-unless-d, which given an input tuple A
returns the tuple
〈 permit : A ↓p ∨ A ↓n ∨ A ↓i deny : A ↓d
not-app : false indet : false 〉
and d-unless-p, which behaves similarly.
Finally, the translation of top-level PDP terms {Alg policies : Policy+} is the same as that of the corre-
sponding policy sets with target true and no obligations, i.e. {Alg target : true policies : Policy+ }.
6.3 Properties of the Translation
The key result regarding the translation is that the semantics of the constraint-based representation of a
policy and the semantics of the policy itself do agree. This correspondence is clearly limited to only those
policies using the instantiation strategy all. Before presenting this result, we show for the constraint semantics
a result analogous to Theorem 5.1.
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Theorem 6.1 (Total and Deterministic Constraint Semantics).
1. For all c ∈ Constr and r ∈ R, there exists an el ∈ (Value ∪ 2Value ∪{error,⊥}), such that C[[c]]r = el .
2. For all c ∈ Constr, r ∈ R and el , el ′ ∈ (Value ∪ 2Value ∪ {error,⊥}), it holds that
C[[c]]r = el ∧ C[[c]]r = el ′ ⇒ el = el ′ .
Proof. By structural induction on the syntax of c (see Appendix B.2).
Theorem 6.2 (Policy Semantic Correspondence). For all p ∈ Policy enclosing combining algorithms only
using all as instantiation strategy, and r ∈ R, it holds that
P[[p]]r = 〈dec io∗〉 ⇔ C[[TP {|p|} ↓dec ]]r = true
Proof. The proof (see Appendix B.2) is by induction on the depth, i.e. the nesting level, of p and relies on
three auxiliary correspondence results regarding expressions (Lemma B.1), obligations (Lemma B.2) and
combining algorithms (Lemma B.3).
This theorem implies that the properties verified over the constraints resulting from the translation of
a FACPL policy would return the same results as if they were directly proven on the FACPL policy itself.
Thus, it ensures that the analysis we present in Section 7 is sound.
From the previous theorems it follows that policy constraint tuples partition the set of input requests, in
other words each access request satisfies only one of the constraints of a policy constraint tuple. Essentially,
the following corollary extends Theorem 6.1 to constraint tuples.
Corollary 6.3 (Constraint-based partition). For all r ∈ R and p ∈ Policy, such that TP {|p|} = 〈permit :
c1 deny : c2 not-app : c3 indet : c4 〉, it holds that
∃!k ∈ {1, . . . , 4} : C[[ck]]r = true ∧
∧
j∈{1,...,4}\{k}C[[cj ]]r = false
Proof. The thesis immediately follows from Theorems 6.1 and 6.2.
6.4 Constraint-based Representation of the e-Health case study
We now apply the translation functions introduced in Section 6.2 to (a part of) the considered case study.
For the sake of presentation, we shorten the attribute names used within policies. For instance, the rule
addressing Requirement (1) becomes as follows
( permit target : equal(sub/role, “doctor”)
and equal(act/id, “write”)
and in(“e-Pre-Write”, sub/perm)
and in(“e-Pre-Read”, sub/perm))
Its translation starts by applying function TE to the target expression. The resulting constraint is as follows
ctrg1 , sub/role = “doctor” ∧˙ act/id = “write”
∧˙ “e-Pre-Write” ∈ sub/perm
∧˙ “e-Pre-Read” ∈ sub/perm
The translation proceeds by considering obligations; in this case they are missing (i.e., they correspond to
the empty sequence ), hence the constraint true is obtained. Function TP finally defines the constraint tuple
for the rule as follows
〈permit : ctrg1 ∧ true
deny : false
not-app : ¬ctrg1
indet : ¬(isBool(ctrg1) ∨ isMiss(ctrg1)) ∨ (ctrg1 ∧ ¬true)〉
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The tuples for the rules addressing Requirements (2) and (3) are defined similarly, they only differ in the
constraints representing their targets, which are denoted as ctrg2 and ctrg3, respectively.
We can now define the constraint-based representation of Policy (P1). Besides the target expression,
which is straightforwardly translated to the constraint ctrgP , res/typ = “e-Pre”, the constraint tuple is
built up from the result of function TA representing the application of the algorithm p-over. Specifically,
the constraint tuples of rules are iteratively combined according to the definition of p-over(A,B) previously
reported. For example, the combination of the first two rules generates the following tuple
〈 permit : (ctrg1 ∧ true) ∨ (ctrg2 ∧ true)
deny : (false ∧ false) ∨ (false ∧ ¬ctrg2) ∨ (¬ctrg1 ∧ false)
not-app : ¬ctrg1 ∧ ¬ctrg2
indet : ((¬(isBool(ctrg1) ∨ isMiss(ctrg1))
∨(ctrg1 ∧ ¬true)) ∧ ¬(ctrg2 ∧ true))
∨(¬(ctrg1 ∧ true) ∧ (¬(isBool(ctrg2)
∨ isMiss(ctrg2)) ∨ (ctrg2 ∧ ¬true))) 〉
Notably, the deny constraint is never satisfied, because it is a disjunction of conjunctions having at least one
false term as argument. This is somewhat expected, because the rules have the permit effect and the used
combining algorithm is p-over. This tuple is then combined with that of the remaining rule in a similar way.
To generate the constraint tuple of the policy, we also need the constraint-based representation of its
obligations. The policy contains only one obligation for the effect permit, whose corresponding constraint is
as follows
cobl p ,
∧
n∈{sys/time,res/typ,sub/id,act/id} ¬isMiss(n) ∧ ¬isErr(n)
The constraint corresponding to obligations for the effect deny, which are missing, is instead true.
Finally, the constraint tuple of Policy (P1) generated by function TP is as follows
〈permit : ctrgP ∧ ((ctrg1 ∧ true) ∨ (ctrg2 ∧ true) ∨ (ctrg3 ∧ true)) ∧ cobl p
deny : ctrgP ∧ ((((false ∧ false) ∨ (false ∧ ¬ctrg2) ∨ (¬ctrg1 ∧ false)) ∧ false)
∨(((false ∧ false) ∨ (false ∧ ¬ctrg2) ∨ (¬ctrg1 ∧ false)) ∧ ¬ctrg3)
∨((¬ctrg1 ∧ ¬ctrg2) ∧ false)) ∧ true
not-app : ¬ctrgP ∨ (ctrgP ∧ (¬ctrg1 ∧ ¬ctrg2 ∧ ¬ctrg3))
indet : ¬(isBool(ctrgP ) ∨ isMiss(ctrgP ))
∨(ctrgP ∧ (((¬(isBool(ctrg1) ∨ isMiss(ctrg1)) ∨ (ctrg1 ∧ ¬true)) ∧ ¬(ctrg2 ∧ true))
∨ ¬((ctrg1 ∧ true) ∧ (¬(isBool(ctrg2) ∨ isMiss(ctrg2))
∨(ctrg2 ∧ ¬true))) ∧ ¬(ctrg3 ∧ true)) ∨ (¬((ctrg1 ∧ true) ∨ (ctrg2 ∧ true)) ∧ (¬(isBool(ctrg3)
∨ isMiss(ctrg3)) ∨ (ctrg3 ∧ ¬true)))
∨(ctrgP ∧ ((ctrg1 ∧ true) ∨ (ctrg2 ∧ true) ∨ (ctrg3 ∧ true)) ∧ ¬cobl p)
∨(ctrgP ∧ ((((false ∧ false) ∨ (false ∧ ¬ctrg2) ∨ (¬ctrg1 ∧ false)) ∧ false)
∨(((false ∧ false) ∨ (false ∧ ¬ctrg2) ∨ (¬ctrg1 ∧ false)) ∧ ¬ctrg3)
∨((¬ctrg1 ∧ ¬ctrg2) ∧ false)) ∧ ¬true)〉
As this example demonstrates, the constraints resulting from the translation are a single-layered repre-
sentation of policies that fully details all the aspects of policy evaluation. However, it is also evident that
the evaluation, as well as the generation, of such constraints cannot be done manually, but requires a tool
support.
7 Analysis of FACPL Policies
The analysis of FACPL policies we propose aims at verifying different types of properties by exploiting the
constraint-based representation of policies. We first formalise a relevant set of properties in terms of expected
authorisations for requests, and then we define the strategies for their automated verification by means of
constraints.
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Furthermore, since FACPL does not enjoy the safety property (see Section 5.6), the analysis investigates
how the extension of a request through the addition of further attributes might change its authorisation
in a possibly unexpected way. Intuitively, it is important to consider the authorisation decisions not only
of specific requests, but also of their extensions because, e.g., a malicious user could try to exploit them
to circumvent the access control system. This analysis approach is partially inspired by the probabilistic
analysis on missing attributes introduced in [9].
In the following, we first formalise the proposed properties (Section 7.1) and present some concrete
examples of them from the case study (Section 7.2). Afterwards, we show how to express the constraint
formalism into a tool-accepted specification (Section 7.3) and exploit it to automatically verify the properties
with an SMT solver (Section 7.4).
7.1 Formalisation of Properties
We consider both properties that refer to the expected authorisation of single requests, i.e. authorisation
properties (Section 7.1.1), and to the relationships among policies on the base of the whole set of authori-
sations they establish, i.e. structural properties (Section 7.1.2); afterwards we comment on their automatic
verification (Section 7.1.3).
7.1.1 Authorisation Properties
To formalise the authorisations properties, we introduce the notion of request extension set of a given request
r . It is defined as follows
Ext(r) , {r ′ ∈ R | r(n) 6=⊥ ⇒ r ′(n) = r(n)}
The set is formed by all those requests that possibly extend request r with new attributes not already defined
by r .
Evaluate-To. This property, written r eval dec, requires the policy under examination to evaluate the
request r to decision dec. The satisfiability, written sat, of the Evaluate-To property by a policy p is defined
as follows
p sat r eval dec iff P[[p]]r = 〈dec io∗〉
In practice, the verification of the property boils down to apply the semantic function P to p and r , and to
check that the resulting decision is dec.
May-Evaluate-To. This property, written r evalmay dec, requires that at least one request extending the
request r evaluates to decision dec. The satisfiability of the May-Evaluate-To property by a policy p is
defined as follows
p sat r evalmay dec iff ∃ r ′ ∈ Ext(r) : P[[p]]r ′ = 〈dec io∗〉
This property, as well as the next one, addresses additional attributes extending the request r by considering
the requests in its extension set Ext(r).
Must-Evaluate-To. This property, written r evalmust dec, differs from the previous one as it requires all
the extended requests to evaluate to decision dec. The satisfiability of the Must-Evaluate-To property by a
policy p is defined as follows
p sat r evalmust dec iff ∀r ′ ∈ Ext(r) : P[[p]]r ′ = 〈dec io∗〉
Of course, additional properties can be obtained by combining the previous ones like, e.g., a property
requiring that all requests in Ext(r) may evaluate to dec and must not evaluate to dec′. Again, request
extensions can be exploited to track down possibly unexpected authorisations.
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7.1.2 Structural Properties
A structural property refers to the structure of the sets of authorisations established by one or multiple
policies. In case of multiple policies, the properties aim at characterising the relationships among the policies.
Different structural properties have been proposed in the literature (e.g. in [18] and [26]) by pursuing different
approaches for their definition and verification. Here, we consider a set of commonly addressed properties
and provide a uniform characterisation thereof in terms of requests and policy semantics.
Completeness. A policy is complete if it applies to all requests. Thus, the satisfiability of the Completeness
property by a policy p is defined as follows
p sat complete iff ∀ r ∈ R : P[[p]]r = 〈dec io∗〉, dec 6= not-app
Essentially, we require that the policy applies to any request, i.e. it always returns a decision different
from not-app. Notably, in this formulation indet is considered as an acceptable decision; a more restrictive
formulation could only accept permit and deny.
Disjointness. Disjointness among policies means that such policies apply to disjoint sets of requests. Thus,
this property, written disjoint p′, requires that there is no request for which both the policy under exami-
nation and the policy p′ evaluate to a decision considered admissible, i.e. permit or deny. The satisfiability
of the Disjointness property by a policy p is defined as follows
p sat disjoint p′ iff ∀ r ∈ R : P[[p]]r = 〈dec io∗〉,P[[p′]]r = 〈dec′ io′∗〉,
{ dec, dec′ } 6⊆ {permit, deny}
It is worth noticing that disjoint polices can be combined with the assurance that the allowed or forbidden
authorisations established by each of them are not in conflict, which simplifies the choice of the combining
algorithm to be used.
Coverage. Coverage among policies means that one of such policies establishes the same decisions as the
other ones. More specifically, the property cover p′ requires that for each request r for which p′ evaluates
to an admissible decision, the policy under examination evaluates to the same decision. The satisfiability of
the Coverage property by a policy p is defined as follows
p sat cover p′ iff ∀ r ∈ R : P[[p′]]r = 〈dec io∗〉, dec ∈ {permit, deny}
⇒ P[[p]]r = 〈dec io′∗〉
Thus, p calculates at least the same admissible decisions as p′. Consequently, if p′ also covers p, the two
policies establish exactly the same admissible authorisations.
These structural properties permit statically reasoning on the relationships among policies and support
system designers in developing and maintaining policies. One technique they enable is the change-impact
analysis [18]. This analysis examines policy modifications for discovering unintended consequences of such
changes.
7.1.3 Towards Automated Verification
It is worth noticing that the analysis approach we propose is feasible in practice, although the involved sets
of requests might be infinite, e.g. the request extension set of a given request and the set of all possible
requests. Indeed, Lemma 5.2 implies that only the attribute names occurring within the policies of interest
are relevant for their analysis, and these are finite in number; any other name cannot affect policy evaluation.
For instance, to analyse a policy p, we must not consider the set R of all possible requests, but only the set of
those requests whose domain is Names(p), i.e. the finite set of attribute names occurring in p. This property
paves the way for carrying out automated property verification by means of SMT solvers as described in
Section 7.4.
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7.2 Properties on the e-Health case study
By way of example, we address in terms of authorisation and structural properties the case of pharmacists
willing to write an e-Prescription in the e-Health case study.
Given the patient consent policies in Section 4.3, i.e. Policies (P1) and (P2), we can verify whether
they disallow the access to a pharmacist that wants to write an e-Prescription. To this aim, we define an
Evaluate-To property8 as follows
(sub/role, “pharmacist”)(act/id, “write”)(res/typ, “e-Pre”) eval deny (Pr1)
which requires that such request evaluates to deny. Alternatively, by exploiting request extensions, we can
check if there exists a request for which a pharmacist acting on e-Prescription can be evaluated to not-app.
This corresponds to the May-Evaluate-To property defined as follows
(sub/role, “pharmacist”)(res/typ, “e-Pre”) evalmay not-app (Pr2)
The verification of these properties with respect to Policy (P1) results in
Policy (P1) unsat (Pr1) Policy (P1) sat (Pr2)
where unsat indicates that the policy does not satisfy the property. Indeed, as already pointed out in
Section 4.3, each request assigning to act/id a value different from read evaluates to not-app, hence property
(Pr1) is not satisfied while property (Pr2) holds. On the contrary, the verification with respect to Policy (P2)
results in
Policy (P2) sat (Pr1) Policy (P2) unsat (Pr2)
Both results are due to the internal policy (deny) which, together with the algorithm p-over, prevents not-app
to be returned and establishes deny as default decision.
The analysis can also be conducted by relying on the structural properties. By verifying completeness,
we can check if there is a request that evaluates to not-app. We get
Policy (P1) unsat complete Policy (P2) sat complete
As expected, Policy (P1) does not satisfy completeness, i.e. there is at least one request that evaluates to
not-app, whereas Policy (P2) is complete. Instead, we can check if Policy (P2) correctly refines Policy (P1)
by simply verifying coverage. We get
Policy (P2) sat cover Policy (P1)
This follows from the fact that Policy (P2) evaluates to permit the same set of requests as Policy (P1) and
that Policy (P1) never returns deny; clearly, the opposite coverage property does not hold. It should be also
noted that the two policies are not disjoint (as they share the set of permitted requests).
7.3 Expressing Constraints with SMT-LIB
Property verification requires extensive checks on large (possibly infinite) amounts of requests, hence, in
order to be practically effective, tool support is essential. To this aim, we express the constraints defined
in Section 6 by means of the SMT-LIB language (http://smtlib.cs.uiowa.edu/), that is a standardised
constraint language accepted by most of the SMT solvers. Intuitively, SMT-LIB is a strongly typed functional
language expressly defined for the specification of constraints. Of course, the feasibility of the SMT-based
reasoning crucially depends on decidability of the satisfiability checks to be done; in other words, the used
SMT-LIB constructs must refer to decidable theories, as e.g. uninterpreted function and array theories. We
now provide a few insights on the SMT-LIB coding of our constraints.
The key element of the coding strategy is the parametrised record type representing attributes. This
type, named TValue, is defined as follows
8 For the sake of presentation, in this subsection we write requests using the FACPL syntax (i.e., they are specified as
sequences of attributes) rather than using their semantical functional representation.
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Tab. 8: Type inference rules for (an excerpt of) FACPL expressions; we use X as a type variable, U as a
type name or a type variable, and we assume that Bool , Double, String , Date, 2Value identify both
the values’ domains and their type names
v ∈ Bool
Γ ` v : Bool | true
v ∈ Double
Γ ` v : Double | true
v ∈ String
Γ ` v : String | true
v ∈ Date
Γ ` v : Date | true
v ∈ 2Value
Γ ` v : 2Value | true
Γ(n) = X
Γ ` n : X | true
Γ ` expr : U | C
Γ ` not(expr) : Bool | C ∧U = Bool
Γ ` expr1 : U1 | C1 Γ ` expr2 : U2 | C2
Γ ` eop(expr1, expr2) : Bool | C1 ∧ C2 ∧U1 = Bool ∧U2 = Bool
eop ∈ {and, or}
Γ ` expr1 : U1 | C1 Γ ` expr2 : U2 | C2
Γ ` equal(expr1, expr2) : Bool | C1 ∧ C2 ∧U1 = U2
Γ ` expr1 : U1 | C1 Γ ` expr2 : 2U2 | C2
Γ ` in(expr1, expr2) : Bool | C1 ∧ C2 ∧U1 = U2
(declare-datatypes (T) ((TValue
(mk-val (val T)(miss Bool)(err Bool)))))
Hence, each attribute consists of a 3-valued record, whose first field val is the value with parametric type T
assigned to the attribute, while the boolean fields miss and err indicate, respectively, if the attribute value
is missing or has an unexpected type. Additional assertions, not shown here for the sake of presentation,
ensure that the fields miss and err cannot be true at the same time, and that, when one of the last two fields
is true, it takes precedence over val. Of course, a specification formed by multiple assertions is satisfied
when all the assertions are satisfied.
The declaration of TValue outlines the syntax of SMT-LIB and its strongly typed nature. This means that
each attribute occurring in a policy has to be typed, by properly instantiating the type parameter T. Since
FACPL is an untyped language, to reconstruct the type of each attribute, we define the type inference system
(whose excerpt is) reported in Table 8. The rules are straightforward and infer the judgment Γ ` expr : U | C
which, under the typing context Γ, assigns the type (or the type variable) U to the FACPL expression expr
and generates the typing constraint C. Specifically, Γ is an injective function that associates a type variable
to each attribute name, while C is basically made of conjunctions and disjunctions of equalities between
variables and types. The generated typing constraint will be processed at the end of the inference process to
establish well-typedness of an expression. Thus, a FACPL expression is well-typed if C is satisfiable, i.e. there
exists a type assignment for the typing variables occurring in C that satisfies C. Moreover, a FACPL policy
is well-typed if the typing constraints generated by all the expressions occurring in the policy are satisfied
by a same assignment. These type assignments are then used to instantiate the type parameters of the
SMT-LIB constraints representing well-typed policies.
The type inference system aims at statically getting rid of all those policies containing expressions that
are not well-typed. For instance, given the expression or(cat/id, equal(cat/id, 5)) and the typing context
Γ(cat/id) = Xcat/id, the inference rules assign the type Bool to the expression and generate the constraint
Xcat/id = Double ∧ Xcat/id = Bool ∧ Bool = Bool . This constraint is clearly unsatisfiable (as attribute cat/id
cannot simultaneously be a double and a boolean), hence a policy containing such expression is not well-
typed and would be statically discarded. Notably, the use of the field err allows the analysis to address
the role of errors in policy evaluations, i.e. to reason on the authorisations of requests assigning values of
unexpected type to attribute names. It is indeed crucial to analyse also these requests, since a possible
attacker can leverage on them to circumvent the access control system.
On top of the TValue datatype we build the uninterpreted functions expressing the operators of the
proposed constraint formalism. By way of example, the operator ∧˙ corresponds to the FAnd function defined
as follows
(define-fun FAnd
((x (TValue Bool)) (y (TValue Bool)))
(TValue Bool)
(ite (and (isTrue x) (isTrue y))
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(mk-val true false false)
(ite (or (isFalse x) (isFalse y))
(mk-val false false false)
(ite (or (err x) (err y))
(mk-val false false true)
(mk-val false true false)))))
where mk-val is the constructor of TValue records. Hence, the function takes as input two TValue Bool
records (i.e., type Bool is the instantiation of the type parameter T) and returns a Bool record as well. The
conditional if-then-else assertions ite are nested to form a structure that mimics the semantic conditions of
Table 7, so that different TValue records are returned according to the input. The function isFalse (resp.
isTrue) is used to compactly check that all fields of the record are false (resp. only the field val is true).
All the other constraint operators, except ∈, are defined similarly.
To express the operator ∈, we need to represent multivalued attributes. Firstly, we define an array
datatype, named Set, to model sets of elements as follows
(define-sort Set (T) (Array Int T))
where the type parameter T is the type of the elements of the array. By definition of array, each element has
an associated integer index that is used to access the corresponding value. Thus, a multivalued attribute
is represented by a TValue record with type an instantiated Set, e.g. (TValue (Set Int)) is an attribute
whose value is a set of integers. Consequently, we can build the uninterpreted function modelling the
constraint operator ∈. In case of integer sets, we have
(define-fun inInt
((x (TValue Int)) (y (TValue (Set Int))))
(TValue Bool)
(ite (or (err x)(err y))
(mk-val false false true)
(ite (or (miss x) (miss y))
(mk-val false true false)
(ite (exists ((i Int))
(= (val x) (select (val y) i)))
(mk-val true false false)
(mk-val false false false)))))
where the command (select (val y) i) takes the value in position i of the set in the field val of the
argument y. In addition to the conditional assertions, the function uses the existential quantifier exists for
checking if the value of the argument x is contained in the set of the argument y.
The coding approach we pursue generates, in most of the cases, fully decidable constraints. In fact,
since we support non-linear arithmetic, i.e. multiplication, it is possible to define constraints for which
a constraint solver is not able to answer. Anyway, modern constraint solvers are actually able to resolve
nontrivial nonlinear problems that, for what concerns access control policies, should prevent any undefined
evaluation9. Similarly, the quantifier-based constraints are in general not decidable, but solvers still succeed
in evaluating complicated quantification assertions due to, e.g., powerful pattern techniques (see, e.g., the
documentation of Z3). Notice anyway that if we assume that each expression operator in (and, consequently,
constraint operator ∈) is applied to at most one attribute name, the quantifications are bounded by the
number of literals defining the other operator argument.
Concerning the value types we support, SMT-LIB does not provide a primitive type for Date. Hence, we
use integers to represent its elements. Furthermore, even though SMT-LIB supports the String type, the Z3
solver we use does not. Thus, given a policy as an input, we define an additional datatype, say Str, with
9 It should be noted that if at least one argument of each occurrence of the multiply operator is a numeric constant, then
the resulting non-linear arithmetic constraints are decidable.
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as many constants as the string values occurring in the policy. The string equality function is then defined
over TValue records instantiated with type Str.
By way of example, the SMT-LIB code for the constraint ctrg1 (see Section 6.4) is
(define-fun cns_target_Rule1
()
(TValue Bool)
(FAnd
(equalStr n_sub/role cst_doc)
(FAnd (equalStr n_act/id cst_write)
(FAnd
(inStr cst_permWrite n_sub/perm)
(inStr cst_permRead n_sub/perm)))))
where identifiers starting with n (resp. cst ) represent attribute names (resp. literals) of the represented
expression. The whole SMT-LIB code for Policy (P1) can be found at http://facpl.sf.net/eHealth/.
7.4 Automated Properties Verification
The SMT-LIB coding permits using SMT solvers to automatically verify the properties formalised in Sec-
tion 7.1. In the following, given a FACPL policy p, we denote by 〈permit : smtlib-cp deny : smtlib-cd not-app :
smtlib-cn indet : smtlib-ci〉 the tuple of SMT-LIB codes representing the formal constraints TP {|p|} = 〈permit :
cp deny : cd not-app : cn indet : ci〉. Hereafter, we present first the strategies to follow for verifying the au-
thorisation properties, then those for verifying the structural properties.
7.4.1 Authorisation Properties
The verification of authorisation properties requires: (i) to introduce into the policy constraint of interest,
which is chosen according to the property, the SMT-LIB coding of the request defined by the property; (ii)
to check the satisfiability (or validity) of the resulting constraint.
Given a request r , the SMT-LIB coding of the request is defined as follows
rsmtlib , (assert (= (val n) v))(assert (and (not (miss n))
(not (err n))))
r(n) = v

Thus, all attribute names n in r are asserted to be equal to their value v and to be neither missing nor
erroneous. Furthermore, given a FACPL policy p, we also define the following SMT-LIB coding of the
request
rsmtlib(p) ,{
(assert (miss n)) n ∈ Names(p) ∧ r(n) =⊥ }
where, as in Section 5.6, Names(p) indicates the set of attribute names occurring in p. Thus, all the names
n that occur in p and are not assigned to a value in r are asserted to be missing attributes.
By exploiting this SMT-LIB coding of requests, we define the automated verification (i.e., via an SMT
solver) of the authorisation properties as follows
p sat r eval dec iff
smtlib-cdec ◦ rsmtlib ◦ rsmtlib(p) is sat
p sat r evalmay dec iff
smtlib-cdec ◦ rsmtlib is sat
p sat r evalmust dec iff
smtlib-cdec ◦ rsmtlib is valid
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where ◦ indicates the concatenation of SMT-LIB code10 and valid means that the corresponding SMT-LIB
code is a valid set of assertions. Some comments follow.
The Evaluate-To property does not exploit request extensions, hence all attribute names not assigned
by the considered request can only assume the special value ⊥. This means that the request r is coded
in SMT-LIB with rsmtlib and rsmtlib(p). The satisfiability of the property thus corresponds to that of the
resulting SMT-LIB code.
To verify the May-Evaluate-To property, since it considers request extensions, the request has to be coded
only with rsmtlib. As before, the satisfiability of the property corresponds to that of the resulting SMT-LIB
code.
Finally, to verify the Must-Evaluate-To property, we code again the request with rsmtlib only, but we
check the validity of the resulting SMT-LIB code, i.e. that it is satisfied by all the assignments for the
attribute names. This amounts to check if the negation of the resulting SMT-LIB code is not satisfiable, in
which case the property holds.
7.4.2 Structural Properties
The verification of structural properties does not require to modify policy constraints, but rather to check
the unsatisfiability of combinations of constraints. It is defined as follows
p sat complete iff smtlib-cn is unsat
p sat disjoint p′ iff
smtlib-cp ◦ smtlib-c′p is unsat
smtlib-cp ◦ smtlib-c′d is unsat
smtlib-cd ◦ smtlib-c′p is unsat
smtlib-cd ◦ smtlib-c′d is unsat
p sat cover p′ iff{ ¬ smtlib-cp ◦ smtlib-c′p is unsat
¬ smtlib-cd ◦ smtlib-c′d is unsat
where smtlib-c′dec refers to the SMT-LIB code modelling decision dec of policy p
′. Some comments follow.
The trivial case is that of the completeness property, which only amounts to check if the constraint
modelling the decision not-app is not satisfiable, i.e. if its negation is valid. If it is, the property holds.
The disjointness of two policies is verified by checking, one at a time, if the conjunctions between the
permit or deny constraint of the first policy and the permit or deny constraint of the second policy are not
satisfiable. If this holds for the four possible combinations of those constraints, the property holds.
The coverage of policy p on policy p′ is verified by checking if the conjunction between the negation of the
permit (resp., deny) constraint of p and the permit (resp., deny) constraint of p′ is not satisfiable. Intuitively,
if the policy p does not calculate a permit or deny decision (i.e., ¬ smtlib-cp and ¬ smtlib-cd hold), policy p′
cannot do it as well, otherwise the property is not satisfied. If this holds for the two conjunctions separately,
the property holds.
8 The FACPL Toolchain
The coding, analysis and enforcement tasks pursued in the development of FACPL specifications are fully
supported by a Java-based software toolchain11, graphically depicted in Figure 3. The key element of the
toolchain is an Eclipse-based IDE that provides features like, e.g., static code checks and automatic generation
of runnable Java and SMT-LIB code. An expressly developed Java library is used to compile and execute
the Java code, while the analysis of SMT-LIB code exploits the Z3 solver.
10 Notably, checking the satisfiability of the SMT-LIB code resulting from the concatenation of two (sets of) SMT-LIB
assertions amounts to check if both the assertions hold at the same time.
11 The FACPL supporting tools are freely available and open-source; binary files, source files, unit tests and documentation
can be found at the FACPL website http://facpl.sf.net.
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Fig. 3: The FACPL toolchain
To provide interoperability with the standard XACML and the various available tools supporting it (e.g.,
XCREATE [5], Margrave [18] and Balana [48]), the IDE automatically translates FACPL code into XACML
one and vice-versa. Because of slightly different expressivity, there are some limitations in FACPL and
XACML interoperability (see Section 9.1 for further details).
Furthermore, to allow newcomer users to directly experiment with FACPL, the web application “Try
FACPL in your Browser” (reachable from the FACPL website) offers an online editor for creating and
evaluating FACPL policies; the e-Health case study is there reported as a running example. Additionally,
the web interface reachable from http://facpl.sf.net/eHealth/demo.html shows a proof-of-concept demo
on how a FACPL-based access control system can be exploited for providing e-Health services.
In the rest of this section, we detail the FACPL Java library and IDE, while Section 9.4 reports perfor-
mance and functionality comparisons with other similar tools.
8.1 The FACPL Library
The Java library we provide aims at representing and evaluating FACPL policies, hence at fully implementing
the evaluation process formalised in Section 5. To this aim, driven by the formal semantics, we have
defined a conformance test-suite that systematically verifies each library unit (e.g., expressions and combining
algorithms) with respect to its formal specification.
For each element of the language the library contains an abstract class that provides its evaluation
method. In practice, a FACPL policy is translated into a Java class that instantiates the corresponding
abstract one and adds, by means of specific methods (e.g., addObligation), its forming elements. Similarly,
a request corresponds to a Java class containing the request attributes and a reference to a context handler
that can be used to dynamically retrieve additional attributes at evaluation-time.
Evaluating requests amounts to invoke the evaluation method of a policy, which coordinates the evaluation
of its enclosed elements in compliance with its formal specification. In addition to the authorisation process,
the library supports the enforcement process by defining the three enforcement algorithms and a minimal
set of pre-defined PEP actions, i.e. log, mailTo and compress. Additional actions can be dynamically
introduced by providing their implementation classes to the PEP initialisation method.
By way of example, we report in the following listings (an excerpt of) the Java code of Policy (P1)
introduced in Section 4.3. Besides the specific methods used for adding policy elements, the Java code
highlights the use of class references for selecting expression operators and combining algorithms. This
design choice, together with the use of best-practices of object-oriented programming, allows the library
to be easily extended with, e.g., new expression operators, combining algorithms and enforcement actions.
Notice that rules are private inner classes, because they cannot be referred outside the enclosing policy sets.
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Fig. 4: The FACPL IDE
public class PolicySet_e -Prescription extends PolicySet{
public PolicySet_e -Prescription (){
addCombiningAlg(PermitOverrides.class);
addTarget(new ExpressionFunction(Equal.class , "e-Prescription",
new AttributeName("resource","type")));
addRule(new rule1());
addRule(new rule2());
addRule(new rule3());
addObligation(new Obligation("log",Effect.PERMIT ,ObligationType.M,
new AttributeName("system","time"),new AttributeName("resource","type"),
new AttributeName("subject","id"),new AttributeName("action","id")));}
private class rule1 extends Rule{
rule1 (){
addEffect(Effect.PERMIT);
addTarget (... new ExpressionFunction(In.class ,
new AttributeName("subject","permission"),"e-Pre -Write") ,...);}}
private class rule2 extends Rule{ rule2 (){...} }
private class rule3 extends Rule{ rule3 (){...} }}
Besides the four-valued decisions considered so far, the FACPL library also supports the extended inde-
terminate values used by XACML, i.e. indetP, indetD and indetDP. They can be used to specify the potential
decision (permit, deny and both, respectively) that should have been returned by the evaluation of a policy
if an error would not have occurred. Extended indeterminate values allow the PDP to obtain additional
information about policy evaluation, which can be exploited, e.g., during policy debugging for improving
the treatment of errors. However, their usage may require additional workload. In fact, it establishes that
if the target of a policy set evaluates to error, rather than stopping and returning indet, the evaluation
process continues the computation by processing the enclosed policies and using the decision resulting from
the application of the combining algorithm to calculate an extended indeterminate value. Thus, e.g., if the
combining algorithm returns the decision permit, the evaluation of the policy returns indetP. For all these
reasons, we have chosen to support the extended indeterminate values by means of a boolean parameter (of
the method doAuthorisation) whose setting can enable or disable their use at each PDP invocation.
8.2 The FACPL IDE
The FACPL IDE (see the screenshot in Figure 4) is developed as an Eclipse plug-in and aims at bringing
together the available functionalities and tools. Indeed, it fully supports writing, evaluating and analysing
FACPL specifications. The plug-in has been implemented by means of Xtext (http://www.eclipse.org/
Xtext/), that is a framework to design and deploy domain-specific languages.
The plug-in accepts an enriched version of the FACPL language, which contains high level features
facilitating the coding tasks. In particular, each policy has an identifier that can be used as a reference to
include the policy within other policies, while specific linguistic handles enable the definition of new expression
operators and combining algorithms. In order to ease the organisation of large policy specifications, the plug-
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in supports modularisation of files and import commands extending file scopes.
The development environment provided by the plug-in is standard. It offers graphical features (e.g.,
keywords highlighting, code suggestion and navigation within and among files), static controls on FACPL
code (e.g., uniqueness of identifiers and type checking), and automatic generation of Java, XACML, and
SMT-LIB code. To configure all the required libraries, a dedicated wizard creates a FACPL-type project.
To facilitate the analysis of FACPL policies, the plug-in also provides a simple interface allowing policy
developers to specify the authorisation and structural properties to be verified on a certain policy. Thus,
the plug-in automatically generates the corresponding SMT-LIB files according to the strategies reported in
Section 7.4; an execution script for the Z3 solver is also generated. Of course, the SMT-LIB files can be also
evaluated by any other solver accepting SMT-LIB and supporting the theories we use.
As previously pointed out, the Java library is flexible enough to be easily extended. The plug-in facilitates
this task by means of dedicated commands. For instance, to define a new expression operator, once a
developer has defined the signature of the new function (which is used for type checking and inference), a
template of its Java and SMT-LIB implementation is automatically generated. The actual implementation
of the Java class, as well as that of the SMT-LIB function, is left to the developer.
In the FACPL IDE, all the mentioned functionalities are offered via the customised FACPL project created
by the dedicated wizard. Once the project is created, the policy developer can write code starting from the
basic FACPL and XACML examples already provided or from scratch. A FACPL file is a generic text file
with extension .fpl, which has dedicated text editor, outline view and contextual menus. Functionalities
supporting code development, e.g. code suggestion and auto-completion, are available via the usual Eclipse
shortcuts and menus. In particular, from either the toolbar menu or the right-click editor menu, the developer
can find a set of pre-defined commands to generate Java, XACML and SMT-LIB code, or to open a step-
by-step wizard for the definition of authorisation and structural properties.
9 Related Work
A preliminary version of FACPL was introduced in [36] with the aim of formalising the semantics of XACML.
The language presented here addresses a wider range of aspects concerning access control. Specifically, the
syntax of the language is cleaned up and streamlined (e.g., rule conditions are integrated with rule targets and
the policy structure is simplified); at the same time, it is extended with additional combining algorithms,
the PEP specification, an explicit syntax for expressions, and obligations. This latter extension widens
FACPL applicability range and expressiveness, as it provides the policy evaluation process with further,
powerful means to affect the behaviour of controlled systems (see e.g. [32] for a practical example of a
policy-based manager for a Cloud platform). Additional important differences concern the definition of the
policy semantics: in [36] it is given in terms of partitions of the set of all possible requests, while here
it is defined in a functional fashion with respect to a generic request. The new approach also features
the formalisation of combining algorithms in terms of binary operators and instantiation strategies, and
the automatic management of missing attributes and evaluation errors throughout the evaluation process.
Most of all, the aim of this work is significantly different: we do not only propose a different language,
but we provide a complete methodology that encompasses all phases of policy lifecycle, i.e. specification,
analysis and enforcement. Concerning the analysis, we define a set of relevant authorisation and structural
properties (whose preliminary definition is given in [34]) characterised in terms of sets of requests. We
then introduce a constraint-based representation of policies and an SMT-based approach for mechanically
verifying properties on top of constraints. To effectively support the functionalities, we provide a fully-
integrated software toolchain.
In the rest of this section we survey more closely related work. First, we comment on differences and
interoperability of FACPL with the already mentioned standard XACML (Section 9.1). Then, we discuss
other relevant policy languages (Section 9.2), and approaches to the analysis of (access control) policies
(Section 9.3). Finally, we compare supporting tools (Section 9.4).
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Tab. 9: FACPL vs. XACML on the e-Health case study
Policy Number of lines Saved Number of types Saved
XACML FACPL lines XACML FACPL types
e-Prescription 239 24 89,95% 10.656 894 91,61%
e-Dispensation 239 24 89,95% 10.674 914 91,43%
Patient Consent 423 38 91,01% 19.195 1.558 91,88%
9.1 FACPL vs XACML
XACML [38] is a well-established standard for the specification of attribute-based access control policies
and requests. It has an XML-based syntax and an evaluation process defined in accordance with [49] (hence
similar to the FACPL one). As a matter of notation, hereafter the words emphasised in sans-serif, e.g. Rule,
are XML elements, while element attributes are in italics.
From a merely lexical point of view, FACPL allows developers to define each policy element via a
lightweight mnemonic syntax and leads to compact policy specifications. Instead, the XML-based syn-
tax used by XACML ensures cross-platform interoperability, but generates verbose specifications that are
hardly of immediate comprehension for developers and are not suitable for formally defining semantics
and analysis techniques. Table 9 exemplifies a lexical comparison between the FACPL policies for the e-
Health case study and the corresponding XACML ones (both groups of policies can be downloaded from
http://facpl.sf.net/eHealth/).
Although FACPL and XACML policies have a similar structure, there are quite a number of (semantic)
differences. Hereafter we outline the main ones.
In FACPL, request attributes are referred by structured names. In XACML, they are referred by either
AttributeDesignator or AttributeSelector elements. The former one corresponds to a typed version of a struc-
tured name, while the latter one is defined in terms of XPath expressions, which are not supported by FACPL.
Anyway, FACPL can represent some of them by appropriately using structured names; e.g. an AttributeSe-
lector with category subject and an XPath expression like type/id/text() correspond to subject/type.id.
A XACML Target is made of Match elements defining basic comparison functions on request attributes.
The elements are then organised in terms of the tag structure AnyOf-AllOf-Match. This structure can be
rendered in FACPL by means of, respectively, the expression operators and-or-and. However, slightly different
results can be obtained from target evaluations due to the management of errors and missing attributes.
Indeed, when a value is missing, the XACML semantics of Match elements returns error or false (according to
the setting of the boolean parameter MustBePresent), whereas the FACPL semantics of the target elements
(depending on the expression operator) can return ⊥ possibly until the level of policies is reached, where ⊥ is
converted to false; the same occurs for evaluation errors. From our point of view, the FACPL management of
missing attributes and evaluation errors is smoother than the XACML’s one. Indeed FACPL can distinguish
if a boolean target function has returned false due to a not satisfied comparison or due to a missing attribute;
instead, XACML cannot always do it.
Additionally, the evaluation of Match functions in XACML is iteratively defined on all the retrieved
attribute values. To ensure a similar behaviour in FACPL, a XACML expression such as, e.g., an equality
comparison must be translated into an operator defined on sets, like e.g. in. Clearly, this limits the amount
of XACML functions that can be faithfully represented in FACPL.
Except for target evaluation, the semantics of XACML and FACPL policies mainly comply with each
other. However, the specification approach fostered by FACPL is more generic and poses less constraints on
the policy structure. In particular, XACML prescribes a policy structure based on Policys, i.e. collections of
Rules, and PolicySets, i.e. collections of Policys and/or PolicySets. Most of all, XACML forces specific con-
straints on targets of Policy and Policy Set: they can only contain comparison functions and each comparison
can only contain one attribute name. Moreover, XACML supports fewer combining algorithms than FACPL,
as well as instantiation strategies (indeed, XACML only provides the greedy one). Additionally, as previously
pointed out, XACML specialises the decision indet into three sub-decisions: for the sake of presentation, we
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Tab. 10: Comparison of some relevant policy languages (X∗ means that user encoding is required)
Features XACML Ponder ASL PTaCL [41] [2] FACPL
Rule-based X X X
Logic-based X X X X
Mnemonic spec. X X
Comb. algorithms X X∗ X∗ X X∗ X
Obligations X X X
Missing attributes X X X
Error handling X X
have not considered them in the formal development of FACPL, but they are fully supported by the FACPL
library (see Section 8).
FACPL and XACML share the same management of obligations, although in FACPL this process is
specified in a more precise manner, i.e. through the instantiation strategies and the binary combining opera-
tors. It is also worth noticing that the XACML ‘obligation fulfilment’ is termed ‘obligation instantiation’ in
FACPL, since indeed the evaluation of obligations by the PDP does not carry out any task beyond its mere
instantiation.
Also, XACML provides some constructs that do not crucially affect policy expressiveness and evaluation.
For instance, Variable elements permit defining pointers to expression declarations. These constructs are not
directly supported by FACPL.
To sum up, except for minor differences on tangled XACML aspects mainly concerning the management
of missing attributes and evaluation errors, FACPL subsumes XACML policies not containing XML raw
data by offering, at the same time, a higher flexibility in the policy specification approach and a richer set
of combining algorithms. Most differently from XACML, FACPL provides a formal semantics that supports
formally-based analysis techniques.
9.2 Policy Languages for Access Control
Policy languages have recently been the subject of extensive research, both by industry and academia. Indeed,
policies permit managing different important aspects of system behaviours, ranging from access control to
adaptation and emergency handling. We compare in the following the main policy languages devoted to
access control, which is our focus; Table 10 summarises the comparison.
Among the many proposed policy languages, we can identify two main specification approaches: rule-
based, as e.g. the XACML standard and Ponder [11, 47], and logic-based, as e.g. ASL [24], PTaCL [8] and
the logical frameworks in [2]. Many other works, as e.g. [31, 41, 39], study (part of) XACML by formally
addressing peculiar features of design and evaluation of access control policies.
In the rule-based approach, policies are structured into sets of declarative rules. The seminal work [42]
introduces two types of policies: authorisations and obligations. Policies of the former type have the aim of
establishing if an access can be performed, while those of the latter type are basically Event-Condition-Action
rules triggering the enforcement of adaptation actions. This setting is at the basis of Ponder.
Ponder is a strongly-typed policy language that, differently from FACPL, takes authorisation and obli-
gations policies apart. Ponder does not provide explicit strategies to resolve conflictual decisions possibly
arising in policy evaluation, rather it relies on abductive reasoning to statically prevent conflicts from occur-
ring, although no implementation or experimental results are presented. On the contrary, FACPL provides
combining algorithms, as we think they offer higher degrees of freedom to policy developers for managing
conflicts. Similarly to Ponder, FACPL uses a mnemonic textual specification language and addresses value
types, although they are not explicitly reported. Finally, the FACPL evaluation process is triggered by
requests and not by events as in Ponder. Anyway, the FACPL approach is as general as the Ponder one
since, by exploiting attributes, requests can represent any event of a system.
The logic-based approach mainly exploits predicate or multi-valued logics. Most of these proposals are
36
based on Datalog [7] (see, e.g., [24, 20, 14]), which implies that the access rules are defined as first order
logic predicates. In general, these approaches offer valuable means for a low-level design of rules, but the
lack of high-level features, e.g. combining algorithms or obligations, prevent them from representing policies
like those of FACPL.
ASL is one of the firstly defined logic-based languages. It expresses authorisation policies based on user
identity credentials and authorisation privileges, and supports hierarchisation and propagation of access
rights among roles and groups of users. Additional predicates enable the definition of (a posteriori) integrity
checks on authorisation decisions, e.g. conflict resolution strategies. Differently from ASL, FACPL provides
high-level constructs and offers by-construction many not straightforward features like, e.g., conflict resolu-
tion strategies. A suitable use of policies hierarchisation enables propagation of access rights also in FACPL
specifications.
PTaCL follows the logic-based approach as well, but it does not rely on Datalog. It defines two sets of
algebraic operators based on a multi-valued logic: one modelling target expressions, the other one defining
policy combinations. These operators emphasise the role of missing attributes in policy evaluation, in a
way similar to FACPL, but only partially address errors. In fact, combination operators are not defined on
error values: it is rather assumed that all target functions are string equalities that never produce errors.
Similarly to FACPL, PTaCL permits formalising the non-monotonicity and safety properties of attribute-
based policies introduced in [45]. The PTaCL extension reported in [10] introduces obligations and their
instantiation, but it still lacks error handling.
A similar study, but more focussed on the distinguishing features of XACML, is reported in [39]. It
introduces a formalisation of XACML in terms of multi-valued logics, by first considering 4-valued decisions
and then 6-valued ones. Most of the XACML combining algorithms are formalised as operators on a partially
ordered set of decisions, while the algorithms first-app and one-app are defined by case analysis. Differently
from FACPL, this formalisation does not deal with missing attributes and obligations, which have instead a
crucial role in XACML policy evaluation.
Another logic-based language is presented in [2]. In this case, a policy is a list of constraint assertions
that are evaluated by means of an SMT solver. The framework supports reasoning about different properties,
but any high-level feature, e.g. combining algorithms, has to be encoded ‘by hand’ into low-level assertions.
In addition, missing attributes, erroneous values and obligations are not addressed.
Multi-valued logics and the relative operators have also been exploited to model the behaviour of com-
bining algorithms. For example, the Fine-Integration Algebra introduced in [41] models the strategies of
XACML combining algorithms by means of a set of 3-valued (i.e., permit, deny and not-app) binary opera-
tors. The behaviour of each algorithm is then defined in terms of the iterative application of the operators
to the policies of the input sequence. This approach significantly differs from the FACPL one since it does
not consider the indet decision. Instead, [31] explicitly introduces an error handling function that, given two
decisions, determines whether their combination produces an error, i.e. an indet decision. Each (binary)
operator is then defined using such error function. The formalisation of FACPL combining algorithms follows
a similar approach, but it also deals with obligations and instantiation strategies, which require different
iterative applications of operators.
Moreover, in [31] nonlinear constraints are used for the specification of combining algorithms which return
a decision dec if the majority of the input policies return dec. Such algorithms are not usually dealt with in
the literature and cannot be expressed in terms of iterative application of some binary operators.
9.3 Analysis of Access Control Policies
The increasing spread of policy-based specifications has prompted the development of many verification
techniques like, e.g., property checking and behavioural characterisations. Such techniques have been im-
plemented by means of different formalisms, ranging from SMT formulae to multi-terminal binary decision
diagrams (MTBDD), including different kinds of logics. Hereafter we review the more relevant ones.
The works concerning policy analysis that are closer to our approach are of course those exploiting SMT
formulae. In [46], a strategy for representing XACML policies in terms of SMT formulae is introduced.
The representation, which is based on an informal semantics of XACML, supports integers, booleans and
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reals, while the representation of sets of values and strings is only sketched. The combining algorithms are
modelled as conjunctions and disjunctions of formulae representing the policies to be combined, i.e. in a form
similar to the approach shown in Appendix A. As a design choice, formulae corresponding to the not-app
decision are not generated, because they can be inferred as the complementary of the other ones. Thus,
in case of algorithms like d-unless-p, additional workload is required. Moreover, the representation assumes
that each attribute name is assigned only to those values that match the implicit type of the attribute,
hence the analysis cannot deal with missing attributes or erroneous values. Finally, it does not take into
account obligations, which have instead an important role in the evaluation. The SMT-based framework
of [2], mentioned in Section 9.2, suffers from similar drawbacks.
The only analysis approach that takes missing attributes into account is presented in [9]. The analysis
is based on a notion of request extension, as we have done in Section 7. Differently from our approach, this
analysis aims at quantifying the impact of possibly missing attributes on policy evaluations.
The change-impact analysis of XACML policies presented in [18] aims at studying the consequences of
policy modifications. In particular, to verify structural properties among policies by means of automatic
tools, this approach relies on an MTBDD-based representation of policies. However, it cannot deal with
many of the XACML combining algorithms and, as outlined in [2], an SMT-based approach like ours scales
significantly better than the MTBDD one.
Datalog-based languages, like e.g. ASL, only provide limited analysis functionalities, that are anyway
significantly less performant than SMT-based approaches. In general, these languages are useful to reason
on access control issues at an high abstraction level, but they neglect many of the advanced features of
modern access control systems.
Description Logic (DL) is used in [26] as a target formalism for representing a part of XACML. The
approach does not take into account many combining algorithms and the decisions not-app and indet. Thus,
it only permits reasoning on a set of properties significantly reduced with respect to that supported by our
SMT-based approach. Furthermore, DL reasoners support the verification of structural properties of policies
but suffer from the same scalability issues as the MTBDD-based reasoners.
Answer Set Programming (ASP) is used in [1, 40] for encoding XACML and enabling verification of
structural properties that are similar to the complete one defined in Section 7.1.2. This approach however
suffers from some drawbacks due to the nature of ASP. In fact, differently from SMT, ASP does not support
quantifiers and multiple theories like datatype and arithmetic. Some seminal extensions of ASP to “Modulo
Theories” have been proposed, but, to the best of our knowledge, no effective solver like Z3 is available.
Similarly, the work in [22] exploits the SAT-based tool Alloy [23] to detect inconsistencies in XACML
policies. However, as outlined in [2] and [18], Alloy is not able to manage even quite small policies and, more
importantly, it cannot reason on arithmetic or any additional theory.
Finally, it is worth noticing that various analysis approaches using SAT-based tools have been developed
for the Ponder language, see e.g. [3]. These approaches, however, cannot actually be compared with ours
due to the numerous differences among Ponder and FACPL. Furthermore, many other works deal with the
analysis of access control policies by using, e.g., process algebra and model checking techniques. However,
they consider only a limited part of access control policy aspects and suffer from scalability issues with
respect to SMT-based tools.
In summary, all the approaches to the analysis of access control policies mentioned above are deficient in
several respects when compared with ours. Those based on SMT formulae do not address relevant aspects
like, e.g. missing attributes, while the other ones do not enjoy the benefits of using SMT, i.e. support of
multiple theories and scalable performance.
9.4 Supporting Tools: Performance and Functionalities
The effectiveness of supporting tools is a crucial point for the usability of a policy language. Therefore,
hereafter we examine the performance of both the FACPL Java library and the SMT-based automatic
analysis, and the functionalities offered by the FACPL IDE.
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Concerning the library, we conducted two different tests12: (i) a performance comparison with a state-
of-the-art XACML tool on the CONTINUE [28] case study (partially analysed in [18]); (ii) a performance
stress test on a large set of randomly generated policies, thus to analyse the scalability of the library. We
present below our test results, focussing on the most relevant ones; the suites of policies and requests, as
well as all test results, are available at http://facpl.sf.net/test/.
Fig. 5: FACPL vs. Balana performance evaluation
The XACML standard is by now the point-of-reference for industrial access control. In the authors’
knowledge, the most up-to-date, freely available XACML tool is Balana [48]. Differently from our frame-
work that represents FACPL policies as Java classes, Balana manages XACML policies directly in XML by
exploiting a DOM representation of the XML files and evaluating XACML requests through a visit of the
DOM representing the policy. We have compared the evaluation of more than 1.500 requests and obtained
the results reported in Figure 5; for the sake of readability only 700 requests are reported. The mean request
evaluation time is 0.49ms for FACPL and 1.27ms for Balana: evaluating a Java class ensures higher perfor-
mance than navigating the DOM. Additionally, Balana requires an initial set-up time of 770ms to create the
DOM.
The CONTINUE case study is by now used as a standard benchmark in the field of access control
tools. However it is relatively small: it is made of 24 policies controlling 14 attributes. All policies are
combined through the first-app algorithm thus, as soon as a policy applies, the evaluation stops. Therefore,
for evaluating performance and scalability of the FACPL Java library, we have also considered a set of large
randomly-generated policies. We generated the policies according to the following criteria: (i) a variable
number of occurring attribute names (i.e., 10, 100, 1.000 or 10.000); (ii) a variable policy depth (i.e., from
12 Both tests were conducted on a MacBook Pro, 3.1 GHz Intel i7, 16 Gb RAM, running OS X Sierra.
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Tab. 11: (a) Structure of each of policy p(d,w, a), where a is the number of occurring attributes names; (b)
Total number of sub-policies for each combination of d and w
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Fig. 6: FACPL performance stress test (when a = 10.000)
1 to 5); (iii) a variable policy width (i.e., from 1 to 5); (iv) only the all instantiation strategy is used (so to
always require the evaluation of all the occurring policies). The combinations of the previous criteria give
rise to a test-bed of 100 policies, formed by a distinct number of differently structured sub-policies featuring
a different number of attribute names. More specifically, given a number of attribute names a, depth d and
width w, the policy p(d,w, a) is generated according to the template in Table 11a. Namely, d corresponds
to the nesting levels in the policy hierarchy, while w corresponds to the number of policies that each policy
(set) in the hierarchy contains. The total number of sub-policies contained by every policy p(d,w, a) is
summarised in Table 11b. For each of the 25 generated policies, there are 4 different versions, one for each
value that a can take.
The generated test-bed has been used to perform the stress test on the FACPL library. The results, when
a is set to 10.000, are summarised in Figure 6. The graphs show how the performance changes as a function
of the policy structure, i.e. depending on d and w. Better performances are obtained by structuring policies
in terms of larger width values (marked by the blue square), rather than larger depth values (marked by the
green triangle). Namely, the average evaluation time increases more significantly by increasing policy depth
than width.
Concerning the automatic analysis, as previously pointed out, the tool closer to ours is that of [2], which
relies on the SMT solver Yices [15]. Differently from Z3, Yices does not support datatype theory, which
is instead crucial to deal with a wide range of policy aspects, as e.g. missing and erroneous attributes. To
analyse the completeness of the CONTINUE policies, the Yices-based tool requires around 570ms, while
our Z3-based tool requires around 120ms13. Notably, other tools not based on SMT, like e.g. Margrave,
have significantly worse performance when policies scale. In fact, as reported in [2], the increment of the
number of possible values for the attributes occurring in the CONTINUE policies prevents Margrave to
accomplish the analysis. On the contrary, SMT solvers can also deal with infinite sets of attribute values,
as e.g. integers. To further evaluate the analysis performance, we also report in Figure 7 the time required
to verify the satisfiability of the not-app constraint (i.e., the verification of the complete property; marked
by the blue square), and the permit constraint (marked by the green triangle) of the policies p(5, 5, a), i.e.
3905 policies, with a varying number a of attributes. Namely, the complete property is always verified
in less than one second, despite the increasing number of attributes. Instead, the verification time for the
satisfiability of the permit constraint increases by rising the number of attribute names, but the increments
are significantly lower than the attribute name variations, i.e. from 199s with 1.000 attribute names, to 394s
13 The Yices value is taken directly from [2], since the provided CONTINUE implementation only runs on Windows machines.
Therefore, we ran this Z3 analysis on an older comparable hardware configuration (with the current configuration it takes only
60ms).
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with 10.000 ones. The difference between the two cases is due to the policy semantics: as soon as a policy
target is not-app, the whole policy is not-app, while a policy evaluates to permit according to the combination
strategies of the chosen combining algorithms. It is finally worth noticing that the considered policies have a
limited number of attribute names representing set values. In fact, a higher number of set attributes would
require many satisfiability checks of existential quantifiers along with the 3905 policies (see the definition
of the inInt function in Section 7.3). In such a case, the analysis remains feasible, i.e. hours instead of
minutes, according to the cases. For example, it lasts two hours for the case of 100 attribute names and 20
set attributes, while it cannot complete for the case of 1.000 attribute names and 200 set ones.
We conclude by commenting on the most strictly related IDEs. To the best of our knowledge,
the only freely available IDEs are the ALFA Eclipse plugin by Axiomatics (http://www.axiomatics.
com/alfa-plugin-for-eclipse.html) and the graphical editor of the Balana-based framework (http:
//xacmlinfo.org/category/xacml-editor/). However, differently from our IDE, they only provide a
high-level language for writing XACML policies. Additionally, ALFA does not provide any request evalua-
tion engine, since the Axiomatics one is a proprietary software.
10 Concluding Remarks and Future Work
We have described a full-fledged framework for the specification, analysis and enforcement of access control
policies. Our framework relies on FACPL and is built on top of solid formal foundations. The FACPL
semantics provides a formalisation of complex access control features —including obligations and missing
attributes, which are instead overlooked by many other proposals— and lays the basis for developing analysis
techniques and tools. We have shown that FACPL policies can be represented in terms of specific SMT
formulae, whose automatic evaluation permits verifying various authorisation and structural properties. We
have demonstrated feasibility and effectiveness of our approach by means of a case study from the e-Health
application domain, which is currently one of the most critical application domains of access control systems.
We have also shown that the use of SMT solvers provides us with stable and efficient tools, ensuring better
performance than many other approaches from the literature.
In a general perspective, our approach brings together the benefits deriving from using a high-level,
mnemonic rule-based language with the rigorous means provided by denotational semantics and constraints.
Most of all, the supporting tools we implemented allow access control system developers to use any of the
formally-defined functionalities provided by our framework, without the need that they be familiar with
formal methods.
Fig. 7: FACPL analysis performance (when d = w = 5)
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We conclude by first enlighting some distinguishing traits of FACPL (Section 10.1), then by pointing out
some future research directions (Section 10.2).
10.1 Discussion
We want here to recap and reflect on a few characteristics of FACPL (and its framework) and the design
choices that underlie them.
Expressiveness. The access control systems expressible by FACPL are those expressible by XACML (but
not dealing with XML raw data, see Section 9.1), with in addition the possibility of using consensus-based
combining algorithms and the all instantiation strategy for obligations. FACPL access control systems
are systematically more compact (see Table 9) and feature a smoother management of errors and missing
attributes. This latter characteristic, together with the fact that we decided not to introduce any static check
on the type of requests, permits to accurately deal with every access control request. Alternatively, we could
have defined a type inference system in order to statically check the policies and infer the expected type of
any attribute name occurring within. Then, we could have reserved evaluation for only those requests whose
attribute names comply with their expected type, while we could have directly returned the indet decision
for all the other requests. By pursuing such an approach, however, we would have lost expressiveness, since
policies could not be able anymore to automatically manage errors due to unexpected attribute values and
possibly mask them by using operators that combine, according to different strategies, indet decisions with
the others.
Besides the definition of access controls, FACPL permits defining obligations, which are a key ingredient
to enhance the expensiveness of access control systems. As exemplified in the definition of the e-Health
case study (see Section 4.3), the instantiation of obligations permits defining context-dependent actions
to be enforced at run-time in the controlled system. Indeed, the side-effects of policy evaluation are not
only the enforcement of access decisions, but also the enforcement of dynamically instantiated actions.
FACPL obligations permit enforcing, e.g., resource usage, adaptation and emergency handling strategies. For
example, in the application of the Ponder language of [43] and in the preliminary version of FACPL of [33, 32],
obligations are used to enforce self-adaptation strategies in autonomic computing systems. Instead, in the
context of emergency handling, an obligation-based approach is proposed in [6, 35] to enforce the principle
known as ‘break the glass’, which means that authorisation controls can be bypassed in case of emergency.
We intentionally abstract from the actual syntax of obligations. They are simply intended to be actions
executed at run-time. From time to time, they can be chosen to more adequately express the access control
system in hand. We also abstract from the actual semantics obligations. Indeed, the discharging of obligations
done by the PEP simply refers to the fact that the system has taken charge of their execution, which is
intended to finish by the conclusion of the PEP enforcement process. However, the possibility of enforcing
some obligations after releasing the decision and granting the access is a topic worth to be studied (it is
indeed one of the future research directions we want to pursue).
Validation. Our framework has essentially three constituent elements: (i) the linguistic constructs together
with their denotational semantics; (ii) the constraint formalism and the semantic-preserving translation;
(iii) the Java-based supporting tools. For each of them we have presented different validation results, both
theoretical and empirical.
The linguistic constructs are validated with respect to their expressiveness. This is done, on the one hand,
by modelling a real-world case study (Section 4.3) from the e-Health application domain, on the other hand,
by comparing (Section 9.1) FACPL with XACML, i.e. the state-of-the-art OASIS standard for attribute-
based access control systems. FACPL formal semantics is validated according to the so-called reasonability
properties of [45] that precisely characterise the expressiveness of a policy language. Besides these properties,
we show that the semantics is well-defined (Theorem 5.1) and precisely characterise the attributes that are
relevant for policy evaluation (Lemma 5.2); this important result, as pointed out in Section 7.1.3, underlies
the automatic property verification. All the results are presented in Section 5.6, while their proofs are
relegated to Appendix B.1.
Similarly, the constraint formalism and the semantic-preserving translation of FACPL policies into SMT
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formulae are validated by the theoretical results presented in Section 6.3 and proved in Appendix B.2. All
together these results ensure that the approach to the analysis of FACPL policies presented in Section 7 is
sound.
The software tools are validated by empirically examining their performance and functionalities. The
obtained results are reported in Section 9.4.
Exploitation. The FACPL framework is a production-level software that is also used in industry. Indeed, since
its preliminary version, FACPL has been used by Tiani Spirit (http://www.tiani-spirit.com/) instead
of XACML to carry out design and automatic analysis of access control policies. In particular, the FACPL
access control engine has been used as XACML reference implementation in several projects. Furthermore,
FACPL was used for team works in a PhD school on engineering Collective Autonomic Systems (http://www.
ascens-ist.eu/springschool) and has been used in many bachelor and master thesis (further details can
be found at the FACPL web-site). These practical exploitations have highlighted that its compact, mnemonic
syntax requires very short learning time, even to undergraduate students. The users have also appreciated
the flexibility of the IDE, which can be smoothly integrated within other development environments.
Extendability. The proposed framework offers a variegated set of constructs, ranging from expression oper-
ators to combining algorithms, for defining access controls. Anyway, to better suit any need, as reported
in Section 8, both the Java library and the IDE can be easily extended with the introduction of, e.g., new
expression operators. This approach supports writing customised FACPL specifications. These specifica-
tions can then be translated, in accordance with the user’s definition of the added constructs, to Java and
SMT-LIB code that can be still evaluated and analysed, respectively. The formal assurance of semantic
preservation (Theorem 6.2) can be easily tailored for encompassing the user’s extensions. For instance, in
case of addition of new expression operators, it only requires devising a constraint operator (or a combination
thereof) that faithfully represents the semantics of the new operator.
10.2 Future Work
In the next future, we plan to address the issue of controlling the accesses while they are in progress. In
this sort of ‘continuative’ access control, the challenge is to ensure guarantees on how granted accesses are
used. This model is usually referred to as Usage Control [30] in the literature and has been recently studied
by various researchers. To deal with usage control, temporal aspects are of paramount importance, both
to refer to ongoing accesses and to enforce obligations after releasing access decisions. To this aim, we will
provide a FACPL-based solution for usage control that, by relying on the already available context-dependent
authorisation process, can control ongoing accesses and instantiate temporal obligations. To actually enforce
these obligations and, consequently, reason on them, we will refine the PEP semantics by appropriately
instantiating the predicate ⇓ok introduced in Section 5.4.
We also plan to provide a formally-based analysis technique that system developers can exploit to ver-
ify, e.g., history-dependent properties like dynamic separation of duty. To this aim, besides formalising
new history-dependent authorisation properties, we want to define and verify properties on conflicts and
dependencies among obligations.
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A Definitions for Combining Algorithms
In this section we report all the definitions regarding the combining algorithms. Table 12 shows all the
combination matrices defining the binary operators ⊗alg for each algorithm alg. Hereafter we report the
constraint resulting from the combination of two constraint tuples, say A and B, defined according to the
various combining algorithms.
p-over(A,B) =
〈 permit : A ↓p ∨ B ↓p
deny : (A ↓d ∧ B ↓d) ∨ (A ↓d ∧ B ↓n) ∨ (A ↓n ∧ B ↓d)
not-app : A ↓n ∧ B ↓n
indet : (A ↓i ∧ ¬B ↓p) ∨ (¬A ↓p ∧ B ↓i)〉
d-over(A,B) =
〈 permit : (A ↓p ∧ B ↓p) ∨ (A ↓p ∧ B ↓n) ∨ (A ↓n ∧ B ↓p)
deny : A ↓d ∨ B ↓d
not-app : A ↓n ∧ B ↓n
indet : (A ↓i ∧ ¬B ↓d) ∨ (¬A ↓d ∧ B ↓i)〉
d-unless-p(A,B) =
〈 permit : A ↓p ∨ B ↓p
deny : ¬A ↓p ∧ ¬B ↓p ∧ (A ↓d ∨ A ↓n ∨ A ↓i)
∧(B ↓d ∨ B ↓n ∨ B ↓i)
not-app : false
indet : false〉
p-unless-d(A,B) =
〈 permit : ¬A ↓d ∧ ¬B ↓d ∧ (A ↓p ∨ A ↓n ∨ A ↓i)
∧(B ↓p ∨ B ↓n ∨ B ↓i)
deny : A ↓d ∨ B ↓d
not-app : false
indet : false〉
first-app(A,B) =
〈 permit : A ↓p ∨ (B ↓p ∧ A ↓n)
deny : A ↓d ∨ (B ↓d ∧ A ↓n)
not-app : A ↓n ∧ B ↓n
indet : A ↓i ∨ (A ↓n ∧ B ↓i)〉
one-app(A,B) =
〈 permit : (A ↓p ∧ B ↓n) ∨ (A ↓n ∧ B ↓p)
deny : (A ↓d ∧ B ↓n) ∨ (A ↓n ∧ B ↓d)
not-app : A ↓n ∧ B ↓n
indet : A ↓i ∨ B ↓i ∨ ((A ↓p ∨ A ↓d) ∧ (B ↓p ∨ B ↓d))〉
weak-con(A,B)
〈 permit : (A ↓p ∧ B ↓p) ∨ (A ↓p ∧ ¬B ↓d) ∨ (¬A ↓d ∧ B ↓p)
deny : (A ↓d ∧ B ↓d) ∨ (A ↓d ∧ ¬B ↓p) ∨ (¬A ↓p ∧ B ↓d)
not-app : A ↓n ∧ B ↓n
indet : (A ↓p ∧ B ↓d) ∨ (A ↓d ∧ B ↓p) ∨ A ↓i ∨ B ↓i
strong-con(A,B) =
〈 permit : A ↓p ∧ B ↓p
deny : A ↓d ∧ B ↓d
not-app : A ↓n ∧ B ↓n
indet : A ↓i ∨ B ↓i ∨ (A ↓n ∧ ¬B ↓n) ∨ (¬A ↓n ∧ B ↓n)
∨ (A ↓p ∧ B ↓d) ∨ (A ↓d ∧ B ↓p)〉
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⊗p-over 〈permit FO2〉 〈deny FO2〉 not-app indet
〈permit FO1〉 〈permit FO1•FO2〉 〈permit FO1〉 〈permit FO1〉 〈permit FO1〉
〈deny FO1〉 〈permit FO2〉 〈deny FO1•FO2〉 〈deny FO1〉 indet
not-app 〈permit FO2〉 〈deny FO2〉 not-app indet
indet 〈permit FO2〉 indet indet indet
⊗d-over 〈permit FO2〉 〈deny FO2〉 not-app indet
〈permit FO1〉 〈permit FO1•FO2〉 〈deny FO2〉 〈permit FO1〉 indet
〈deny FO1〉 〈deny FO1〉 〈deny FO1•FO2〉 〈deny FO1〉 〈deny FO1〉
not-app 〈permit FO2〉 〈deny FO2〉 not-app indet
indet indet 〈deny FO2〉 indet indet
⊗d-unless-p 〈permit FO2〉 〈deny FO2〉 not-app indet
〈permit FO1〉 〈permit FO1•FO2〉 〈permit FO1〉 〈permit FO1〉 〈permit FO1〉
〈deny FO1〉 〈permit FO2〉 〈deny FO1•FO2〉 〈deny FO1〉 〈deny FO1〉
not-app 〈permit FO2〉 〈deny FO2〉 〈deny 〉 〈deny 〉
indet 〈permit FO2〉 〈deny FO2〉 〈deny 〉 〈deny 〉
⊗p-unless-d 〈permit FO2〉 〈deny FO2〉 not-app indet
〈permit FO1〉 〈permit FO1•FO2〉 〈deny FO2〉 〈permit FO1〉 〈permit FO1〉
〈deny FO1〉 〈deny FO1〉 〈deny FO1•FO2〉 〈deny FO1〉 〈deny FO1〉
not-app 〈permit FO2〉 〈deny FO2〉 〈permit 〉 〈permit 〉
indet 〈permit FO2〉 〈deny FO2〉 〈permit 〉 〈permit 〉
⊗first-app 〈permit FO2〉 〈deny FO2〉 not-app indet
〈permit FO1〉 〈permit FO1〉 〈permit FO1〉 〈permit FO1〉 〈permit FO1〉
〈deny FO1〉 〈deny FO1〉 〈deny FO1〉 〈deny FO1〉 〈deny FO1〉
not-app 〈permit FO2〉 〈deny FO2〉 not-app indet
indet indet indet indet indet
⊗one-app 〈permit FO2〉 〈deny FO2〉 not-app indet
〈permit FO1〉 indet indet 〈permit FO1〉 indet
〈deny FO1〉 indet indet 〈deny FO1〉 indet
not-app 〈permit FO2〉 〈deny FO2〉 not-app indet
indet indet indet indet indet
⊗weak-con 〈permit FO2〉 〈deny FO2〉 not-app indet
〈permit FO1〉 〈permit FO1•FO2〉 indet 〈permit FO1〉 indet
〈deny FO1〉 indet 〈deny FO1•FO2〉 〈deny FO1〉 indet
not-app 〈permit FO2〉 〈deny FO2〉 not-app indet
indet indet indet indet indet
⊗strong-con 〈permit FO2〉 〈deny FO2〉 not-app indet
〈permit FO1〉 〈permit FO1•FO2〉 indet indet indet
〈deny FO1〉 indet 〈deny FO1•FO2〉 indet indet
not-app indet indet not-app indet
indet indet indet indet indet
Tab. 12: Combination matrices for the binary operators ⊗alg
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B Proofs of the Results
Some of the proofs proceed by induction on the depth of policies, i.e. the number of their nesting levels,
which is defined by induction on the syntax of policies as follows
depth((e target : expr obl : o∗ )) = 0
depth(
{a target : expr policies : p+ obl-p : o∗p obl-d : o∗d }) =
1 + max ({depth(p) | p ∈ p+})
Policies with depth 0 are rules, the other ones are policies containing other policies. Notationally, we will
use pi to mean that policy p has depth i and (p+)i to mean that at least a policy in the sequence p+ has
depth i and the others have depth at most i.
B.1 Proofs of Results in Section 5
Theorem 5.1 (Total and Deterministic Semantics).
1. For all pas ∈ PAS and req ∈ Request , there exists a dec ∈ Decision, such that Pas[[pas, req ]] = dec.
2. For all pas ∈ PAS , req ∈ Request and dec, dec′ ∈ Decision, it holds that
Pas[[pas, req ]] = dec ∧ Pas[[pas, req ]] = dec′
⇒ dec = dec′ .
Proof. The goal of the proof is to show that Pas is a total and deterministic function, i.e. it is defined for
all possible input pairs and always returns the same decision any time it is applied to a specific pair. If we
let pas be { pep : ea pdp : pdp } then, from the clause (S-8), we have that
Pas[[{ pep : ea pdp : pdp }, req ]] =
EA[[ea]](Pdp[[pdp]](R[[req ]]))
Thus, since function composition preserves totality and determinism, we are left to prove that R, Pdp and
EA are total and deterministic functions. Due to their inductive definition (given in Section 5), the proof
proceeds by inspecting their defining clauses with the aim of checking that they satisfy the two requirements
below
R1: there is one, and only one, clause that applies to each syntactic domain element (this usually follows
since the definition is syntax-driven and considers all the syntactic forms that the input can assume);
R2: for each defining clause,
• the conditions in the right hand side are mutually exclusive (from the systematic use of the
otherwise condition, it directly follows that they cover all the possible cases for the syntactic
domain elements of the form occurring in the left hand side),
• the values assigned in each case of the right hand side are obtained by only using total and
deterministic functions/operators/predicates.
Case R. From its defining clauses (S-1) we get that R is defined on all non-empty sequences of attributes,
i.e. all requests. Moreover, the conditions in the right hand side of each clause are mutually exclusive
and the operator uniondbl is total and deterministic by definition. Thus R1 and R2 hold, which means that
R is a total and deterministic function.
Case Pdp. To prove this case, we first prove that E , O, A and P are total functions.
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Case E . By an easy inspection of the clauses defining E , an excerpt of which are in Table 5, it is not
hard to believe that they satisfy R1 (since the application of the clauses is driven by the syntactic
form of the input expression) and R2 above, hence E is a total function. Moreover, since the
operator • is total and deterministic, from the clauses (S-2) it follows that E remains a total and
deterministic function also when extended to sequences of expressions.
Case O. Since E is a total and deterministic function also on sequences of expressions, from the
clauses (S-3a) and (S-3b) it follows that R1 and R2 hold, thus O is a total and deterministic
function both on single obligations and on sequences of obligations.
Cases A and P. The definitions of P and A are syntax-driven and consider all the syntactic forms that
the input can assume, thus R1 is satisfied. Now, since P and A are mutually recursive, we prove
by induction on the depth of their arguments that their defining clauses satisfy R2 for all input
policies.
Base Case (i = 0). Let us start from P. p0 is of the form (e target : expr obl : o∗). We have hence
to prove that the clause (S-4a), which is the defining clause of P that applies to p0, satisfies
R2. This directly follows from the fact that E and O are total and deterministic functions.
Now, let us consider A and proceed by case analysis on a.
(a = algall for any alg). Since the clause (S-4a) satisfies (R1 and) R2, for each p
0
j in (p
+)0,
P[[p0j ]]r is uniquely defined. Thus, since each operator ⊗alg is total and deterministic by
construction, the clause (S-6a), to be used since the form of a, satisfies R2 (when all the
input policies have depth 0).
(a = alggreedy for any alg). This case is similar to the previous one, but involves the clause (S-
6b). It satisfies R2 (when all the input policies have depth 0) since its conditions in the
right hand side are mutually exclusive by construction (indeed, each predicate isFinalalg
and each operator ⊗alg is total and deterministic).
Inductive Case (i = n+ 1). Let us start from P. pn+1 is of the form {a target :expr policies :(p+)n
obl-p : o∗p obl-d : o
∗
d}. By the induction hypothesis, for any r , a and pkj in (p+)n, with k ≤ n,
the clauses defining P and A satisfy (R1 and) R2, that is P[[pkj ]]r and A[[a, (p+)n]]r are
uniquely defined. Hence, the clause (S-4b), to be used since the form of pn+1, satisfies R2 as
well. For A, we can reason like in the base case by exploiting the induction hypothesis. We
can thus conclude that both the clauses (S-6a) and (S-6b) satisfy R2 (for any input policy).
Therefore, P and A are total and deterministic functions.
Now, that Pdp is a total and deterministic function directly follows from its defining clause (S-5).
Case EA. The requirement R1 is satisfied by definition. Moreover, since the predicate ⇓ ok is total and
deterministic, the same holds for the function (( )). Therefore, also R2 is satisfied by each defining clause
(the conditions on res.dec are trivially mutually exclusive). Hence, EA is a total and deterministic
function.
Lemma 5.2 (Policy relevant attributes). For all p ∈ Policy and r , r ′ ∈ R such that r(n) = r ′(n) for all
n ∈ Names(p) it holds that P[[p]]r = P[[p]]r ′.
Proof. The statement is based on an analogous result concerning expressions
for all expr ∈ Expr and r1, r ′1 ∈ R such that
r1(n) = r
′
1(n) for all n ∈ Names(expr),
it holds that E [[expr ]]r1 = E [[expr ]]r ′1
(R)
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which can be easily proven by structural induction on the syntax of expressions. Functions r1 and r
′
1 are
only exploited in the base case when evaluating a name n ∈ Names(expr) for which, by definition and
hypothesis, we have E [[n]]r1 = r1(n) = r ′1(n) = E [[n]]r ′1. Since for any expr occurring in p, we have that
Names(expr) ⊆ Names(p), from (R), by taking r1 = r and r′1 = r′, it follows that
for all expr occurring in p, E [[expr ]]r = E [[expr ]]r ′ (R-E)
From (R-E), it also immediately follows that
for all o occurring in p, O[[o]]r = O[[o]]r ′ (R-O)
Now we can prove the main statement by induction on the depth i of p.
Base Case (i = 0). p0 has the form (e target : expr obl : o∗), thus the clause (S-4a) is used to determine
P[[p]]r . The thesis then trivially follows from (R-E) and (R-O).
Inductive Case (i = n+ 1). pn+1 is of the form {a target : expr policies : (p+)n obl-p : o∗p obl-d : o∗d}, thus
the clause (S-4b) is used to determine P[[p]]r . By the induction hypothesis, for any pkj in (p+)n,
with k ≤ n, it holds that P[[pkj ]]r = P[[pkj ]]r ′. This, due to the clauses (S-6a) and (S-6b), implies
that A[[a, (p+)n]]r = A[[a, (p+)n]]r ′, for any algorithm a. The thesis then follows from this fact and
from (R-E) and (R-O).
B.2 Proofs of results in Section 6
Theorem 6.1 (Total and Deterministic Constraint Semantics).
1. For all c ∈ Constr and r ∈ R, there exists an el ∈ (Value ∪ 2Value ∪{error,⊥}), such that C[[c]]r = el .
2. For all c ∈ Constr , r ∈ R and el , el ′ ∈ (Value ∪ 2Value ∪ {error,⊥}), it holds that
C[[c]]r = el ∧ C[[c]]r = el ′ ⇒ el = el ′ .
Proof. Similarly to the proof of Theorem 5.1, the proof reduces to showing that C is a total and deterministic
function. We proceed by structural induction on the syntax of c.
Base Case. If c = v, the thesis immediately follows since C[[v]]r = v; otherwise, i.e. c = n, we have C[[n]]r =
r(n) and the thesis follows because r is a total and deterministic function.
Inductive Case. It is not hard to believe that all the defining clauses of C are such that the conditions in the
right hand side are mutually exclusive and cover all the necessary cases. For each different form that
c can assume, the thesis then directly follows by the induction hypothesis.
The proof of Theorem 6.2 relies on the following three auxiliary results.
Lemma B.1. For all expr ∈ Expr and r ∈ R, it holds that
E [[expr ]]r = C[[TE{|expr |}]]r
Proof. We proceed by structural induction on the syntax of expr according to the translation rules of the
clause (T-1).
(expr = n). Since TE{|n|} = n, the thesis follows because E [[n]]r = r(n) = C[[n]]r .
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(expr = v). Since TE{|v |} = v , the thesis follows because E [[v ]]r = v = C[[v ]]r .
(expr = not(expr1)). Since TE{|expr |} = ¬˙ TE{|expr1|} and, by the induction hypothesis, E [[expr1]]r =
C[[TE{|expr1|}]]r , the thesis follows due to the correspondence of the semantic clause of the operator ¬˙
in Table 7 and that of the operator not in Table 5.
(expr = op(expr1, expr2)). Since TE{|expr |} = TE{|expr1|} getOp(op) TE{|expr2|} and, by the induction hy-
pothesis, E [[expr1]]r = C[[TE{|expr1|}]]r and E [[expr2]]r = C[[TE{|expr2|}]]r , the thesis follows due to
the correspondence of the semantic clause of the expression operator op in Table 7 and that of the
constraint operator getOp(op) in Table 5.
Lemma B.2. For all o ∈ Obligation and r ∈ R it holds that
O[[o]]r = io ⇔ C[[TOb{|o|}]]r = true
and
O[[o]]r = error ⇔ C[[TOb{|o|}]]r = false
Proof. We only prove the (⇒) implication as the proof for the other direction proceeds in a specular way. Let
o = [t pepAct(expr∗)] with expr∗ = expr1 . . . exprn. By the clause (T-2), it is translated into the constraint
c =
∧
exprj∈expr∗ ¬isMiss(TE{|expr j |}) ∧ ¬isErr(TE{|expr j |})
We now proceed by case analysis on O[[o]]r .
(O[[o]]r = io). We have to prove that C[[c]]r = true. By the definition of C, C[[c]]r = true corresponds to
∀j ∈ {1, . . . , n} :
C[[¬ isMiss(TE{|expr j |})]]r = true
∧ C[[¬ isErr(TE{|expr j |})]]r = true
According to the constraint semantics of ¬, isMiss and isErr, this corresponds to
∀j ∈ {1, . . . , n} :
C[[TE{|expr j |}]]r 6=⊥
∧ C[[TE{|expr j |}]]r 6= error
By the hypothesis O[[o]]r = io and the clauses (S-3a) and (S-2), we have
E [[expr∗]]r = E [[expr1]]r • . . . • E [[exprn]]r = w1 . . .wn
where wj stands for a literal value or a set of values. Thus, by Lemma B.1, we get that
∀j ∈ {1, . . . , n} :
C[[TE{|expr j |}]]r = wj 6∈ {⊥, error}
which proves the thesis.
(O[[o]]r = error). We have to prove that C[[c]]r = false. By the definition of C, C[[c]]r = false corresponds to
∃j ∈ {1, . . . , n} :
C[[¬ isMiss(TE{|expr j |})]]r = false
∨ C[[¬ isErr(TE{|expr j |})]]r = false
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According to the constraint semantics of ¬, isMiss and isErr, this corresponds to
∃j ∈ {1, . . . , n} :
C[[TE{|expr j |}]]r =⊥ ∨ C[[TE{|expr j |}]]r = error
By the hypothesis O[[o]]r = error and the clauses (S-3a) and (S-2), we have
E [[expr∗]]r = E [[expr1]]r • . . . • E [[exprn]]r 6= w∗
⇒ ∃j ∈ {1, . . . , n} : E [[expr j ]]r ∈ {⊥, error}
Thus, by Lemma B.1, we obtain that
∃j ∈ {1, . . . , n} : C[[TE{|expr j |}]]r ∈ {⊥, error}
which proves the thesis.
Lemma B.3. For all algall ∈ Alg, r ∈ R and policies p1, . . . , ps ∈ Policy such that ∀ i ∈ {1, . . . , s} :
P[[pi]]r = 〈deci io∗i 〉 ⇔ C[[TP {|pi|} ↓deci ]]r = true , it holds that
A[[algall, p1 . . . ps]]r = 〈dec io∗〉 ⇔
C[[TA{|algall, p1 . . . ps|} ↓dec ]]r = true
Proof. Since the considered algorithms use the all instantiation strategy, by the hypothesis and the clauses (S-
6a) and (T-4), the thesis is equivalent to prove that
⊗alg(. . .⊗ alg(〈dec1 io∗1〉, 〈dec2 io∗2〉), . . . , 〈decs io∗s〉)
= 〈dec io∗〉
⇐⇒
C[[alg(. . . alg(TP {|p1|}, TP {|p2|}), . . . , TP {|ps|}) ↓dec ]]r
= true
The proof proceeds by case analysis on alg. In what follows, we only report the case of the p-over algorithm,
as the other ones are similar and derive directly from the definitions in Appendix A
When s = 1, we have ⊗p-over(P[[p1]]r) = P[[p1]]r and p-over(TP {|p1|}) = TP {|p1|} by definition, hence the
thesis directly follows from the hypothesis that P[[p1]]r = 〈dec1 io∗1〉 ⇔ C[[TP {|p1|} ↓dec1 ]]r = true . For the
remaining cases, we proceed by induction on the number s of policies to combine.
Base Case (s = 2). We must prove that
⊗p-over(〈dec1 io∗1〉, 〈dec2 io∗2〉) = 〈dec io∗〉
⇔
C[[p-over(TP {|p1|}, TP {|p2|}) ↓dec ]]r = true .
For the sake of simplicity, in the following we omit the sequences of instantiated obligations, as their
combination does not affect the decision dec returned by ⊗p-over. We proceed by case analysis on the
decision dec.
(dec = permit). It follows that dec1 = permit or dec2 = permit. Moreover, by definition we have
p-over(TP {|p1|}, TP {|p2|}) ↓p= TP {|p1|} ↓p ∨ TP {|p2|} ↓p.
(dec = deny). It follows that dec1, dec2 ∈ {deny, not-app}. Moreover, by definition we have
p-over(TP {|p1|}, TP {|p2|}) ↓d= (TP {|p1|} ↓d ∧TP {|p2|} ↓d) ∨ (TP {|p1|} ↓d ∧ TP {|p2|} ↓n) ∨
(TP {|p1|} ↓n ∧ TP {|p2|} ↓d).
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(dec = not-app). It follows that dec1 = dec2 = not-app. Moreover, by definition we have
p-over(TP {|p1|}, TP {|p2|}) ↓n= TP {|p1|} ↓n ∧ TP {|p2|} ↓n.
(dec = indet). It follows that dec1 = indet or dec2 = indet and dec1, dec2 6= permit. Moreover,
by definition we have p-over(TP {|p1|}, TP {|p2|}) ↓i= (TP {|p1|} ↓i ∧¬TP {|p2|} ↓p) ∨ (¬TP {|p1|} ↓p
∧ TP {|p2|} ↓i).
In any case, thesis follows from the hypothesis on TP {|pi|} and the definition of C.
Inductive Case (s = k + 1). By the induction hypothesis the thesis holds for k policies, that is
⊗alg(. . .⊗ alg(〈dec1 io∗1〉, 〈dec2 io∗2〉), . . . , 〈deck io∗k〉)
= 〈dec io∗〉
⇐⇒
C[[alg(. . . alg(TP {|p1|}, TP {|p2|}), . . . , TP {|pk|}) ↓dec ]]r
= true
The thesis then follows by repeating the case analysis on decision dec of the ‘Base Case’
once we replace 〈dec1 io∗1〉, 〈dec2 io∗2〉, TP {|p1|} and TP {|p2|} by 〈dec′ io′∗〉, 〈decs io∗s〉,
p-over(. . . p-over(TP {|p1|}, TP {|p2|}), . . . , TP {|pk|}) and TP {|ps|}, respectively.
Theorem 6.2 [Policy Semantic Correspondence] For all p ∈ Policy enclosing combining algorithms only
using all as instantiation strategy, and r ∈ R, it holds that
P[[p]]r = 〈dec io∗〉 ⇔ C[[TP {|p|} ↓dec ]]r = true
Proof. The proof proceeds by induction on the depth i of p.
Base Case (i = 0). This means that p is of the form (e target : expr obl : o∗ ). We proceed by case analysis
on dec.
(dec = permit). By the clause (S-4a), it follows that
E [[expr ]]r = true ∧ O[[o∗]]r = io∗
Thus, by Lemma B.1, it follows that
C[[TE{|expr |}]]r = true
and, by Lemma B.2 and the clause (T-2), it follows that
C[[TOb{|o∗|}]]r = true
On the other hand, by the clause (T-3a), we have that
TP {|(permit target : expr obl : o∗ )|} ↓p=
TE{|expr |} ∧ TOb{|o∗|}
Hence, by the definition of C, we can conclude that
C[[TP {|(permit target : expr obl : o∗ )|} ↓p]]r=
C[[TE{|expr |}]]r ∧ C[[TOb{|o∗|}]]r=
true ∧ true=true
which proves the thesis.
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(dec = deny). We omit the proof since it proceeds like the previous case.
(dec = not-app). By the clause (S-4a), it follows that
E [[expr ]]r = false ∨ E [[expr ]]r =⊥
By the clause (T-3a), we have that
TP {|(e target : expr obl : o∗ )|} ↓n= ¬ TE{|expr |}
Hence, the thesis directly follows by Lemma B.1 and the definition of C.
(dec = indet). By the clause (S-4a), the otherwise condition holds, that is
¬(E [[expr ]]r = true ∧ O[[o∗]]r = io∗)
∧ ¬(E [[expr ]]r = false ∨ E [[expr ]]r =⊥)
By applying standard boolean laws and reasoning on function codomains, this condition can be
rewritten as follows
¬(E [[expr ]]r = true ∧ O[[o∗]]r = io∗)
∧ ¬(E [[expr ]]r = false ∨ E [[expr ]]r =⊥)
= (E [[expr ]]r 6= true ∨ O[[o∗]]r = error)
∧ (E [[expr ]]r 6∈ {false,⊥})
= E [[expr ]]r 6∈ {true, false,⊥} ∨ (E [[expr ]]r 6∈ {false,⊥}
∧O[[o∗]]r = error)
= E [[expr ]]r 6∈ {true, false,⊥} ∨
(E [[expr ]]r 6∈ {true, false,⊥} ∧ O[[o∗]]r = error) ∨
(E [[expr ]]r = true ∧ O[[o∗]]r = error)
= E [[expr ]]r 6∈ {true, false,⊥}
∨(E [[expr ]]r = true ∧ O[[o∗]]r = error)
On the other hand, by the clause (T-3a), we have that
TP {|(e target : expr obl : o∗ )|} ↓i=
¬ (isBool(TE{|expr |}) ∨ isMiss(TE{|expr |}))
∨ (TE{|expr |} ∧ ¬TOb{|o∗|})
The thesis then follows by Lemmas B.1 and B.2 and the definition of C.
Inductive Case (i = k + 1). p is of the form {algall target : expr policies : (p+)k obl-p : o∗p obl-d : o∗d }. We
proceed by case analysis on dec.
(dec = permit). By the clause (S-4b), it follows that
E [[expr ]]r = true
∧ A[[algall, (p+)k]]r = 〈permit io∗1〉
∧ O[[o∗p ]]r = io∗2
Thus, by Lemma B.1, it follows that
E [[expr ]]r = C[[TE{|expr |}]]r = true
and, by Lemma B.2 and the clause (T-2), it follows that
C[[TOb{|o∗p |}]]r = true
55
Since by the induction hypothesis, for all phi in (p
+)k with h ≤ k, it holds that
P[[phi ]]r = 〈deci io∗〉 ⇔ C[[TP {|phi |} ↓deci ]]r = true
then, by Lemma B.3, it follows that
TA{|algall, (p+)k|} ↓p= true
On the other hand, by the clause (T-3b), we have that
TP {|{algall target : expr policies : (p+)k
obl-p : o∗p obl-d : o
∗
d }|} ↓p
= TE{|expr |} ∧ TA{|algall, (p+)k|} ↓p ∧ TOb{|o∗p |}
Hence, by the definition of C, we can conclude that
C[[TP {|{algall target : expr policies : (p+)k
obl-p : o∗p obl-d : o
∗
d }|} ↓p]]r
= C[[TE{|expr |}]]r ∧ C[[TA{|algall, (p+)k|} ↓p]]r
∧ C[[TOb{|o∗p |}]]r
= true ∧ true ∧ true = true
which proves the thesis.
(dec = deny). We omit the proof since it proceeds like the previous case.
(dec = not-app). By the clause (S-4b), it follows that
E [[expr ]]r = false ∨ E [[expr ]]r =⊥
∨ (E [[expr ]]r = true ∧ A[[algall, (p+)k]]r = not-app)
By the clause (T-3b), we have that
TP {|{algall target : expr policies : (p+)k
obl-p : o∗p obl-d : o
∗
d }|} ↓n
= ¬ TE{|expr |} ∨ (TE{|expr |} ∧ TA{|algall, (p+)k|} ↓n)
The thesis then directly follows by Lemmas B.1 and B.3, due to the induction hypothesis and the
definition of C.
(dec = indet). By the clause (S-4b), the otherwise condition holds, that is
¬(E [[expr ]]r = true ∧ A[[algall, (p+)k]]r = 〈e io∗1〉
∧ (A[[algall, (p+)k]]r = 〈e io∗1〉 =⇒ O[[o∗e ]]r = io∗2)
∧ ¬(E [[expr ]]r = false ∨ E [[expr ]]r = ⊥
∨ (E [[expr ]]r = true ∧ A[[algall, (p+)k]]r = not-app))
(C)
where, to recall the connection between the effect returned by the combining algorithm and the
sequence of obligations that is instantiated, we exploit the tautology
A[[algall, (p+)k]]r = 〈e io∗1〉 ∧ O[[o∗e ]]r = io∗2
=
A[[algall, (p+)k]]r = 〈e io∗1〉
∧(A[[algall, (p+)k]]r = 〈e io∗1〉 =⇒ O[[o∗e ]]r = io∗2)
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By applying standard boolean laws and reasoning on function codomains, the Condition (C) above
can be rewritten as follows
¬(E [[expr ]]r = true ∧ A[[algall, (p+)k]]r = 〈e io∗1〉
∧ (A[[algall, (p+)k]]r = 〈e io∗1〉 =⇒ O[[o∗e ]]r = io∗2)
∧ ¬(E [[expr ]]r = false ∨ E [[expr ]]r = ⊥
∨ (E [[expr ]]r = true ∧ A[[algall, (p+)k]]r = not-app))
=
(E [[expr ]]r 6= true ∨ A[[algall, (p+)k]]r ∈ {not-app, indet}
∨ (A[[algall, (p+)k]]r = 〈e io∗1〉 ∧ O[[o∗e ]]r = error))
∧ (E [[expr ]]r 6∈ {false,⊥}
∧(E [[expr ]]r 6= true ∨ A[[algall, (p+)k]]r 6= not-app))
=
(E [[expr ]]r 6= true ∨ A[[algall, (p+)k]]r ∈ {not-app, indet}
∨ (A[[algall, (p+)k]]r = 〈e io∗1〉 ∧ O[[o∗e ]]r = error))
∧(E [[expr ]]r 6∈ {true, false,⊥}
∨(E [[expr ]]r 6∈ {false,⊥}∧
A[[algall, (p+)k]]r 6= not-app))
=
E [[expr ]]r 6∈ {true, false,⊥}
∨(E [[expr ]]r 6∈ {true, false,⊥}
∧ A[[algall, (p+)k]]r 6= not-app)
∨(E [[expr ]]r 6∈ {true, false,⊥}
∧ A[[algall, (p+)k]]r ∈ {not-app, indet})
∨(E [[expr ]]r 6∈ {false,⊥}
∧ A[[algall, (p+)k]]r 6= not-app
∧ A[[algall, (p+)k]]r ∈ {not-app, indet})
∨(E [[expr ]]r 6∈ {true, false,⊥} ∧ A[[algall, (p+)k]]r = 〈e io∗1〉
∧ O[[o∗e ]]r = error)
∨(E [[expr ]]r 6∈ {false,⊥} ∧ A[[algall, (p+)k]]r 6= not-app
∧ A[[algall, (p+)k]]r = 〈e io∗1〉 ∧ O[[o∗e ]]r = error)
=
E [[expr ]]r 6∈ {true, false,⊥}
∨(E [[expr ]]r 6∈ {false,⊥} ∧ A[[algall, (p+)k]]r = indet)
∨(E [[expr ]]r 6∈ {false,⊥}
∧ A[[algall, (p+)k]]r = 〈e io∗1〉 ∧ O[[o∗e ]]r = error)
=
E [[expr ]]r 6∈ {true, false,⊥}
∨(E [[expr ]]r 6∈ {true, false,⊥} ∧ A[[algall, (p+)k]]r = indet)
∨(E [[expr ]]r = true ∧ A[[algall, (p+)k]]r = indet)
∨(E [[expr ]]r 6∈ {true, false,⊥}
∧A[[algall, (p+)k]]r = 〈e io∗1〉 ∧ O[[o∗e ]]r = error)
∨(E [[expr ]]r = true
∧A[[algall, (p+)k]]r = 〈e io∗1〉 ∧ O[[o∗e ]]r = error)
=
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E [[expr ]]r 6∈ {true, false,⊥}
∨(E [[expr ]]r = true ∧ A[[algall, (p+)k]]r = indet)
∨(E [[expr ]]r = true ∧ A[[algall, (p+)k]]r = 〈e io∗1〉
∧O[[o∗e ]]r = error)
=
E [[expr ]]r 6∈ {true, false,⊥}
∨(E [[expr ]]r = true ∧ A[[algall, (p+)k]]r = indet )
∨(E [[expr ]]r = true ∧ A[[algall, (p+)k]]r = 〈permit io∗1〉
∧O[[o∗p ]]r = error)
∨(E [[expr ]]r = true ∧ A[[algall, (p+)k]]r = 〈deny io∗1〉
∧O[[o∗d ]]r = error)
where the last step exploits the fact that e ∈ {permit, deny}.
On the other hand, by the clause (T-3b), we have that
TP {|{algall target : expr policies : (p+)k
obl-p : o∗p obl-d : o
∗
d }|} ↓i=
¬ (isBool(TE{|expr |}) ∨ isMiss(TE{|expr |}))
∨ (TE{|expr |} ∧ TA{|a, (p+)k|} ↓i)
∨ (TE{|expr |} ∧ TA{|a, (p+)k|} ↓p ∧¬ TOb{|o∗p |} )
∨ (TE{|expr |} ∧ TA{|a, (p+)k|} ↓d ∧¬ TOb{|o∗d |} )
The thesis then follows by Lemmas B.1, B.2 and B.3, due to the induction hypothesis and the
definition of C.
58
